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SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS PLANS -
THE POISON PILL IN THE U.S. AND CANADA:
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
par Jean-François BERNIER*
In anticipation of the Quebec Superior Court's ruling on the Caisse de
dépôt et placement's judicial challenge to the first Canadian prescription
of the «Poison Pill» defense mecanism by Inco Ltd.'s board of directors
in late 1988 to alter unwelcomed take-over attempts, the author examines,
in the first part of his study, the origin and the various legal considera-
tions surrounding the U.S. developped remedy. In the second part, the
author focuses on the prevailing Canadian legal environment from both
a corporate and securities standpoint to question the legal validity of the
«Poison Pill» in light of its growing popularity as the medication of
choice for Canada's directors who whish to insure their preservation of
corporate control.
                        
En prévision de la décision que doit rendre la Cour supérieure du
Québec au sujet de l'action de la Caisse de dépôt et placement en
contestation de la première «pilule empoisonnée» canadienne qu'a
administré le Conseil d'administration d'Inco Ltd. à la fin de 1988 aux
éventuels initiateurs d'une prise de contrôle, l'auteur examine, dans la
première partie de son étude, l'origine et le contexte juridique de ce
recours né aux Etats-Unis. Dans la seconde partie, l'auteur porte son
attention sur les facteurs juridiques du point de vue des sociétés et des
valeurs mobilières qui prévalent au Canada et remet en cause la légalité
de la «pilule empoisonnée», à la lumière de sa popularité croissante
comme remède de choix pour les administrateurs canadiens qui désirent
conserver le contrôle de leur société.
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Background and Legal Considerations
1. «Inco's move started wheels turning in Canadian boardrooms» The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail (12 December 1988) B17.
2. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F. 2d 255, (1984), 258.
3. «The Right Way To Regulate The Market», The [London] Economist (23-29 September
1989) 21.
1. INTRODUCTION
The take-over phenomenon, in recent years, has generated the transfer
of control of some of America's largest corporations and has literally
affected the whole capital market system.  The price tag on the RJR
Nabisco transaction, close to $25 Billions (U.S.) has opened the door to
take-overs of considerable magnitude.  Considering that Bell Canada
Enterprises, one of the few publicly-held Canadian companies without a
dominant shareholder, could be taken over for less than $12 Billions
(Can.), the Canadian financial community is thus watching U.S.
developments in take-over defense strategies with great interest1.
Therefore, it is interesting and relevant to examine, in this context and
from a canadian perspective, the various take-over bid defensive
measures which have proliferated in recent years in the U.S.
One U.S. Court has commented that contests for corporate control are
being «waged with the intensity of military campaigns and the weaponry
of seemingly bottomless bankrolls»2.
The retiring Chairman of the U.K. take-over panel which plays the
regulatory role of British take-over bids recently commented that take-
overs are:  «currently a high profile activity,  attracting not only the
involvement of businessmen, of bankers and of investors, but one that has
increasingly become the stuff of political controversy and public
curiosity.  [Take-over bids] raise issues of economic efficiency, manage-
ment responsibility and personal ethics that can have consequences for
those who do not own the companies concerned:  employees, customers,
sometimes the regions in which the target company operates»3.
In North America, take-over bids have become the most common
transactions in corporate control and, their proliferation has brought about
the development of new strategies to both facilitate take-over attempts
and defend against them.
An increasing number of take-over bids are being resisted by the
directors of the target companies who have developed a wide range of
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4. The term «take-over bid» is used interchangeably throughout the present text with its
American equivalent, «tender offer».  The term «take-over bid» is defined in the Québec
Securities Act, R.S.Q., c. V-1.1, as amended, at s. 110 as an offer to purchase for cash voting
or equity securities of a company whereby the person proposing the bid would obtain or
increase his interest of 20% or more of the outstanding securities of that class of securities
at the date of the offer to purchase.  The term "tender offer" is not defined by American
federal legislation and as a result, U.S. Courts have formulated their own definition.  See for
example S.E.C. v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F. 2d 945 (1985) where the court
found that the existence of a tender offer is determined by the following factors:  (1) active
and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for shares of an issuer; (2) solicitation
made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) offer to purchase made at a
premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather than
negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed maximum number of shares to be
purchased; (6) offer open only for a limited period of time; (7) offeree subjected to selling
pressure; and (8) public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the target
company precede or accompany rapid accumulation of a large amount of a target's securities.
5. For general comments on various defensive measures see L. Serafini, «Survol des tactiques
défensives» in Meredith Memorial Lectures (Cowansville, éd. Yvon Blais, 1987) 141.  See
also W.F. Brown, «Corporate Defenses to Takeover Bids» (1970) 44 Tulane L. Rev. 517;
S.L. Hayes and R.A. Taussig, «Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids» (1967) 45 Harv. Bus. Rev.
135; E.C. Schmults and E.J. Kelly, «Cash Takeover Bids - Defense Tactics» (1967) 23 The
Business Lawyer 115; D.S. Bradshaw, «Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent
Managements in Contesting Tender Offers» (1969) 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1104; S.A. Hochman
and O.D. Folger, «Deflecting Takeovers:  Charter and By-law Techniques» (1979) 34 The
Business Lawyer 537; G.C. Lynch and M.I. Steinberg, «The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers» (1979) 64 Cornell Law Rev. 961.
6. There is wide array of literature on this subject.  See F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel,
«The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer» (1981) 94
Harv. L. Rev. 1161; F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, «Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics
and Shareholders' Welfare» (1981) 36 The Business Lawyer 1733; F.H. Easterbrook and
D.R. Fischel, «Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers» (1982) 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1; M.
Lipton, «Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom:  A Response to Professors Easterbrook
and Fischel» (1980) 55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1231; R.J. Gilson, «A Structural Approach to
Corporations:  The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers» (1981) 33 Stan. L.
Rev. 819; R.J. Gilson, «The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments:  Structural
Limitations on The Enabling Concept» (1982) 34 Stan. L. Rev. 775; R.J. Gilson, «Seeking
Competitive Bids versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense» (1982) 35 Stan. L. Rev.
51; L.A. Bebchuk, «The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers» (1982) 95 Harv.
L. Rev. 1028; L.A. Bebchuk, «The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers:  A Reply
and Extension» (1982) 35 Stan. L. Rev. 23; L. Lowenstein, «Pruning Deadwood in Hostile
Takeovers:  A Proposal For Legislation» (1983) 83 Columbia Law Rev. 249; E.F. Greene
and J.J. Junewicz, «A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions»
(1984) 132 U. of Penn. L. Rev. 647; Matheson and Norberg, «Hostile Share Acquisitions and
Corporate Governance:  A Framework for Evaluating Antitakeover Activities» (1986) 47 U.
of Pitt. L. Rev. 407.
defensive measures against such unsolicited take-over bids4.  An
examination of the arsenal of defensive measures available to the
management of a target company5 and of the debate over the propriety of
such defensive measures as a means of corporate control is however
beyond the scope of the present study.6
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7. The Poison Pill was originally conceived in connection with El Paso's defence strategy
against a hostile take-over bid from Burlington and Northern Railroad.  See J.G. MacIntosh,
«The Poison Pill; A Noxious Nostrum for Canadian Shareholders» (1989) 15 Can.Bus.L.J.
276, n.l.
8. See G. Coleman, «Poison Pills in Canada» (1989) 15 Can.Bus.L.J. 1 at 3 (explaining the
meaning of these respective terms as a «two-step transaction where an acquiror makes a cash
take-over bid for over 50% of a target company's shares followed by a second-step merger
where the remaining shareholders are squeezed out at a lower-valued consideration (hence
the «front-end loading»).  The transaction is financed with high-yield junior debt («junk
bonds») to be paid off (or down) by the sale of assets or subsidiaries of the target (the «bust-
up») after the merger is completed».  A «street sweep» is the rapid accumulation of a huge
block of stock accumulated in one day on the open market by corporate raiders in the U.S.
«Greenmail» is blackmail of a higher financial order and works as follows:  a significant
number of shares of a company is acquired in the market.  The acquiror then threatens a take-
over bid or a proxy fight in order to force the company to buy the shares back at a premium.
See also text, infra, section 4.2(B)(2): Justifying the implementation of a shareholders' rights
plan: Regulatory Issues.
9. J.E.A. Turner, «Inco Limited - The First With A Pill», (Tory, Tory, Deslauriers &
Binnington; Toronto, November 25, 1988 ) [unpublished].
10. H.T. Lacroix, «Reflections on Poison Pills in Canada», (Colloque sur les mesures défensives
en matières d'offres publiques d'achat, Quebec City, 25 September 1989) [unpublished].
Instead  the  following  study  will  examine  in  detail  the back-
ground and the various legal considerations behind one of the newer
mechanisms designed to alter unwelcomed bids euphemistically known
as the Shareholders' Rights Plan.  Since its creation in December 1982 by
take-over lawyer Martin Lipton7, the poison pill has made its way into the
corporate landscape of close to 1,000 American companies.  In Canada,
dozens of companies have adopted or announced their intention to
implement a shareholders' rights plan.
Such a mechanism was conceived to respond to a less regulated
mergers and acquisitions environment in the U.S. that allows such things
as «two-tier front-end loaded junk bond financed bust-up acquisitions»,
«street sweeps» and «greenmail»8.
What was thus needed was a defensive strategy which would:  (i)
discourage coercive or unfair hostile offers; (ii) delay a bidder in order to
provide the target with an opportunity to encourage a competing offer or
to structure a competing transaction (i.e. a recapitalization, a leveraged
buy-out or an offer from a «white knight»); (iii) avoid the sale of «crown
jewels», the bust-up of the target or other destructive defensive strategies
prevalent in the U.S.9
Poison pill plans are designed to be used as a dilatory tactic, hence
providing the target's board of directors with the necessary leverage to
negotiate a more favourable arrangement by forcing a hostile bidder to
come to the bargaining table10.  They are now the predominant and most
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11. See text, infra, section 2.2: Poison Pill Features.
12. Moran v. Household International, Inc., Del. Supr., 500 A. 2d 1346 (1985) aff'g Del. Ch.
490 A. 2d 1059 (1985) [hereinafter Moran].  See also text, infra, section 3.3(b)(ii): Moran
v. Household International Inc.  The Poison Pill was however originated by Lenox Inc. and
Bell & Howell Co. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Lenox Inc., No. 83-2116 (D.N.J.
June 20, 1983) and National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 7278, slip.op., (Del. Ch.
Aug. 25, 1983).  See also, No. 7278, slip.op., (Dec. 13, 1983) (defendant Bell & Howell
Co.'s motion to dismiss for failure of plaintiff to join indispensable parties denied).  Because
of the procedural posture of these cases (injunctive relief to block the implementation of a
poison pill plan) they did not contribute to the determination of the ultimate legality of
poison pill plans.
effective defensive strategy available to U.S. corporations and they come
in a variety of forms which will be discussed in the following pages11.
But, whichever particular forms are adopted, the basic objectives of such
plans are to deter abusive take-over tactics by making them unacceptably
expensive to the prospective acquirors and, to encourage an open
negociation with the board of directors of the target company by making
the rights issued pursuant to the plan redeemable.
Ideally, poison pill plans will be designed to achieve a balance that
will not entrench inefficient management but that will eliminate the most
egregious of the take-over abuses without interfering with the day-to-day
operations of the companies which adopt them.
In November 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court12 upheld the original
«Flip-over» plan as being authorized under the Delaware state corporate
laws and governed by the Business Judgment Rule thereby providing
legal  support  for  adoptions of poison pill plans and opening the door to
further variations of such plans.
Poison pill plans were first developed to deal with the then current
two-tier, front-end loaded tender offer and related techniques.  They
accomplished this by providing the target's shareholders with rights, that
would have to be assumed by a raider in a second-step merger, to buy the
corporate raider's common stock at half of its market price.  The raider
was thus faced with unacceptable dilution unless it either offered a price
that was sufficient to attract the tender of substantially all of the shares
and the rights or negotiated a merger at an acceptable price according to
the target's board of directors so that the rights were redeemed and
thereby removed as an impediment for the acquiror.
Following the Delaware Supreme Court's decision, many companies
adopted plans with «Flip-in» provisions providing that, upon an acquiror
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13. C.R.T.F. Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (C.C.H.) ¶¶ 93,680 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1988); 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y., 1988).
crossing a certain triggering threshold (usually 20%), all the other target's
shareholders are given the right to purchase additional shares of the target
at half price.
Unlike the basic Flip-over plan, this type of plan obtained mixed
results in the courts, even though it provided a greater protection against
take-over abuses.  The effectiveness of the Flip-in is dependent upon its
discriminatory feature. Without this feature, the Flip-in would not result
in dilution for the acquiring company since it would be able to buy
additional shares on the same basis as the other shareholders.
Nonetheless, in the U.S., legal experts recommend to their clients the
adoption of this type of plan but they include in such special shareholders
meeting procedures to approve such a feature in order to meet any judicial
concerns about legality.
Furthermore, in the recent take-over contest involving Federated
Department Stores, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York, applying Delaware law, refused to enjoin a Flip-in plan
notwithstanding its discriminatory feature13.
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Moran also estab-lished
that the adoption of a shareholders' rights plan, notwith-standing its
features, had no effect whatsoever on the fiduciary standards to be
followed by a board of directors responding to a subsequent take-over
bid.  In the event of a specific take-over bid, the plan and its operation
will have to be assessed according to the response that the board decides
to be appropriate based on the advices given at that time by the company's
investment banker and legal counsel.
Such judicial warning, that the legal validity of a poison pill plan will
be examined by the courts as a corporate policy matter, has been carried
out as subsequent court decisions began to chip away at the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision and shifted the judicial focus from the «validi-
ty» of a poison pill plan per se to its «operation» bringing about complex
tests and uncertainty for legal and financial advisers both in the U.S. and
Canada.  Even though U.S. courts have sanctioned the adoption of certain
poison pill plans as defensive measures, such plans have been and will
continue to be the object of continuous litigation and the validity of a
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14. J.M. Stransman and R. Wildeboer, Poison Pills:  Background and Legal Considerations,
Toronto (October 1988) [unpublished].
15. See C. Jordan, «U.S. Takeover Defences - In The Canadian Context» (1988) 2 R.I.B.L. 205.
16. See for examples, S.S. Dawson, R.J. Pence and D.J. Stone, «Poison Pill Defensive
Measures» (1987) 42 The Business Lawyer 423, who give a general definition of a poison
pill as generically referring to «various defensive measures adopted by boards of directors
in response to takeover attempts or in advance of possible takeover attempts that can cause
severe economic repercussions in an acquirer or potential controlling person».  See also R.G.
Clemens, «Poison Debt:  The New Takeover Defense» (1987) 42 The Business Lawyer 747,
who defines the term «poison pill» as describing «Rights or warrants granted to stockholders
by a target company that become exercisable if a raider obtains a specified percentage of the
target's shares and are designed to have unpalatable consequences for the raider».
17. See Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, The effects of
Poison Pills on the Wealth of Target Shareholders, (October 23, 1986) at 1.
particular poison pill plan will be the centre of further judicial considera-
tion and in-depth scrutiny.
The poison pill's popularity in the U.S. market, which affects
Canadian international investors, together with its potential use by
Canadian firms, make it an important defensive tactic to be considered by
Canadian companies, advisors and regulators14.
However, there are evident difficulties arising from the transplanta-
tion of foreign solutions to Canadian problems15.
We will thus try to examine these issues facing the Canadian legal
adviser by trying to transpose an American mechanism in our own legal
and regulatory context.  In the first part of our study, we will focus on the
U.S. situation in order to understand the history of the shareholders' rights
plan as pertaining to its intent and purpose in detail to better analyze, in
the second part, the possible transplantation, north of the border, of such
a defensive measure considering our own legal climate and corporate
governance situation.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF POISON PILLS
2.1 Definitions:  Many authors and legal scholars have attempted to
give a definition of a poison pill rights plan16. The definition of the
Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission
is probably the one that best describes the scope of such a plan17.
There are actually two definitions:
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(a) Short Definition:
A poison pill describes a family of shareholder rights or conver-
tible preferred share (or debt) agreements that, when triggered by
an event such as a tender offer or an actual accumulation of target
stock by a potential acquiror, allows the target shareholders, other
than the acquiror, to purchase additional shares (of the target or,
in some cases, of the acquiror) or to sell shares to the target at
very attractive prices.
(b) Long Definition:
A poison pill is any financial device that, when triggered by a
particular action (e.g. merging a target's assets or acquiring a
specified amount of a target's stock), results in one or a combina-
tion of the following:
(1) the acquiror is forced to purchase securities from the share-
holders of the target firm at prices equal to or exceeding their
market value;
(2) security holders of the target firm gain rights to exchange
stock of the target firm for a combination of cash and securi-
ties from the target firm having a value exceeding that of the
surrendered stock (the acquiror is generally excluded from the
exchange);
(3) the security holders of the target firm gain rights to purchase
securities from the target firm at prices below market value
(the acquiror is generally excluded);
(4) the acquiror must sell its securities at prices below market
value to security holders of the target firm; or
(5) the acquiror loses substantial voting power of its shares
relative to other security holders of the target firm.
A shareholders' rights plan is generically called «poison pill»
because if the pill is «swallowed» it is designed to economically
«poison» the acquiror's take-over attempt.  Besides conferring the
right to purchase stock, the rights also have a «poison pill» aspect
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18. See D.S. Newman, «Delaware Serves Shareholders The "Poison Pill": Moran v. Household
International, Inc.» (1986) 27 Boston College Law Review 641 at 644.
19. See Dawson, Pence and Stone, supra, note 16 at 423.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. at 424.
22. Some rights agreements refer to a triggering event as the «Separation Time» - for upon the
occurence of a triggering event the rights separate from the underlying stock and become
separately exercisable.
designed to deter would-be acquirors18.  Generally, «poison pill plans
are implemented through  the  issuance  of  a  pro  rata  dividend  to
common stockholders of stock or rights to acquire stock and/or other
securities of the issuer or, under certain circumstances, a person or
group («Acquiring Person»)  involved in a business combination with
the issuer»19.  Poison pills are generally not exercisable until the
occurence of specified «triggering events» usually defined to include
a merger or other business combinations with the issuer such as the
announcement or commencement of a tender offer for a specified
percentage of the issuer's capital stock or the accumulation of a
specified per-centage of the issuer's capital stock20.  The poison pill
plan will usually exclude the Acquiring Person from the exercise of
such rights.  «Typically, poison pill rights are redeemable by the
issuer at a nominal price at least until a triggering event occurs»21.
A typical poison pill plan works as follows:  a company issues
rights pursuant to a Rights Agreement between the company and a
trust company acting as rights agent on behalf of the company.  The
rights are distributed as a dividend to all common stockholders of the
company and, until the happening of a triggering event22, trade
together with the common shares and are represented by common
share certificates.  They are valid for a predetermined period which
is usually ten years and have a «strike price» that is relatively high to
make the rights virtually worthless (for example $ 100 compared to
a $ 25 market price).  Because the rights are «out of the money» they
do not dilute earnings per share or otherwise alter the company's
capital structure. The «strike price» is also known as the «exercise
price» at which the registered stockholder may purchase one common
share from the company.  The rights carry no vote and are redeemable
at a nominal amount by the board of directors before and, in some
cases, for a short period after the triggering event to allow the
directors to negociate an acceptable deal for all shareholders.
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23. See R. Wilderboer, «The Poison Pill Playground:  The Search For A Proper Decision Rule»,
LL.M. Thesis, 1987 [unpublished].  Virtually all descriptions in legal literature focus on
types of plans.  This is somewhat misleading, as hybrid plans can and have been developed.
Thus it would be more correct to speak in terms of pill features.  Our discussion will
describe pills in terms of plans, but the plan referred to will be dominated by a certain
feature.  It is the dominant feature that will determine the characterization of the plan, at 27.
For examples of hybrid plans see the outline on poison pills prepared by Jim Freund and Eric
Cochran of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom of New York for the Practicing Law
Institute's 20th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation.
24. See P.J. Thompson, «Shareholder Rights Plans:  Shields or Gavels» (1989) 42 Vanderbilt
Law Review 173 at 181, n. 45 stating that «very similar to poison pills, "poison" securities
are becoming an increasingly popular defense» and citing Clemens, «Creating Financial
Perils for Hostile Acquirors» 22 Mergers & Acquisitions, Nov.Dec. 1987, at 27 (discussing
«poison preferred» and «poison debt»); The Debt Repellent 22 Mergers & Acquisitions,
Jul.-Aug. 1987, at 21-22 (noting companies implementing poison put options).
25. See Dawson, Pence and Stone, supra, note 16 detailing the various types of poison pill plans
available.
The triggering events may vary according to the type of plan
involved.  Usually a triggering event will be the acquisition by a third
party of a given percentage (usually 20%) or more of the voting or
equity securities (common shares to remain in conformity with
securities legislation definition of a take-over bid) or upon the
announcement of an offer to purchase sufficient shares to give the
purchaser a given percentage (at least 30%) of the outstanding
common shares of the company.
Upon the happening of the earlier of these events, the rights
separate from the common shares to which they were formerly
attached, rights certificates are issued and distributed to shareholders
and the rights become separately tradeable and exercisable.
A triggering event will carry various consequences according to
the type of plan involved.  A different type of plan will carry with it
different features to which we now turn our attention23.
2.2 Poison Pill Features:  Five basic versions of poison pills24 have
been introduced since their creation25.
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Pill" Preferred» (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1964.
27. For a detailed illustration of the «fair price» provision designed to assure those stockholders
who do not tender their shares in a take-over bid that they will not be subsequently squeezed
out at unfavourable prices, see Hochman and Folger, supra, note 5 at 553ff. See also E.J.
Kelly, «The Origin and Development of the Fair Price Clause» (1987) 15 Securities
Regulation Law Journal 267.
(a)  Convertible Preferred Stock Dividend Plan
This type of plan also referred to as the «Poison Pill Preferred»26
forms the basis of the first poison pill plan introduced by Lenox
Inc. in June 1983.  The mechanism of which is as follows:
The preferred stock is issued as a pro rata dividend to all holders
of the target company's common stock.  The preferred stock
carries with it the typical features attributable of such stock.
However the poisonous effect is contained in the special redemp-
tion and/or conversion features.
These features are designed to ensure that shareholders receive a
«fair price» and/or to allow them to retain their interest after an
acquisition has been consummated.
The redemption feature would be triggered at some point (e.g.,
thirty days) after an acquiror has accumulated a defined percen-
tage of the stock.  The convertible preferred stock could then be
redeemed, at the option of the holder, at the redemption price
specified in the plan.  However, the acquiror would not be
permitted to participate in any issuer redemption of poison pill
stock.
The price, which is very similar to a «fair price» in a fair price
provision27, is determined through a formula provided in the plan,
which usually reflects the average price for the issuer's common
stock over a specified period of time (usually the price would be
set at the highest price paid by the acquiror for the issuer's
common or preferred stock during the preceeding year).  The
redemption price would be equal to the tender offer price if the
acquiror proceeded via the tender offer process.
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However, the exercise of this redemption privilege is not trigge-
red immediately on the stock acquisition date and the redemption
privilege is made subject to suspension for a period of time in the
event of a publicly announced intention to consummate certain
business combinations.  The acquiror can thus avoid the redemp-
tion provisions and this is where the conversion feature comes
into play.  The plan provides for the avoidance of the redemption
privilege by giving the acquiror an option to complete certain
defined business combinations such as a second-step merger
followed by the issuance of securities that have an economic
value to the stockholder in the acquiror or surviving entity which
is equal to the value prescribed by the conversion provisions.
Business combinations are also usually defined to include
transfers of all or substantially all of the issuer's assets, reorgani-
zation or common stock reclassifications.
In the event of such business combinations, the terms of the
convertible preferred shares require that provisions be made in the
merger agreement to allow for the conversion into an equivalent
amount, such as determined by the plan, of voting stock in the
acquiror or surviving entity.  The issuer would not be allowed to
enter into any of these business combinations unless the acquiror
agreed to comply with the terms set out in the plan.
The effect of these plans depends upon whether a business
combination involving the issuer is consummated.  The redemp-
tion and conversion privileges block the acquiror on two fronts;
if the acquiror acquires a stock position but no business combina-
tion is consummated, the issuer's equity capital would become
depleted by the payment to stockholders of the «fair value»
through redemption of the preferred stock upon demand by the
holders thereof.  The acquiror would then be left with a target in
a weakened financial position.  If, on the other hand, a business
combination is consummated to avoid the triggering of the
redemption privileges then the acquiror will trigger the conver-
sion privileges (of the preferred stock of the issuer into voting
stock of the acquiror) bringing about a dilution of the acquiror's
existing shareholders position.
The poisonous effect of these provisions should not, however, be
exaggerated.  Evidence has showed that a conversion privilege
can easily be avoided.  If the acquiror is an individual, the dilution
will not cause him prejudice.  A publicly held corporation, with
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29. Office of the Chief Economist, Securities & Exchange Commission, «A Study on the
Economics of Poison Pills», [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C.C.H.) ¶¶
83,971 (March. 5, 1986).
30. Supra, note 12.
31. Coleman, supra, note 8 at 2.
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12 at 1349.
a wide share distribution and managed by de facto groups will not
fear dilution either.
Redemption features may also be of limited appeal since most
corporate statutes impose solvency tests to be met before redee-
ming stock.  Also, a company may be restricted by creditors via
covenants to proceed to such stock redemption.
Three of the four companies that have adopted this type of plan
were eventually taken over28 and no companies were reported to
have adopted any version of these plans since 198329.
(b)  Flip-over Plan
Poison pills with Flip-over provisions are usually modeled on the
plan considered by the 1985 Delaware Supreme Court decision in
Moran v. Household International Inc.30.  A Canadian commenta-
tor has referred to this type of plan as the «first generation poison
pill»31.
The typical Flip-over plan works as follows: the company issues
as a pro rata dividend one right or warrant per common share to
purchase a percentage of common or preferred stock of the
issuing company.  The rights or warrants generally have a
fixed-term existence (generally, ten years) and are redeemable by
the issuer for a nominal amount32 prior to the occurence of a
triggering event.  The rights are initially traded with the under-
lying common stock and cannot be exercised.  They usually carry
typical preferred share provisions and their exercise price (or
«strike price») for the acquisition of the issuer's stock will be set
at a level that is «out of the money», bearing no relation to the
Shareholders' Rights Plans -
(1990) 21 R.D.U.S. The Poison Pill in the U.S. and Canada: 139
Background and Legal Considerations
33. The Household pill was designed to provide for the newly issued rights to be immediately
exercisable to purchase 1/100 share of new preferred stock for $ 100.  The «unit» of
preferred stock usually being equivalent in economic terms to one share of common stock,
therefore, if at the date of issuance such common stock traded at $ 25 per share, the
worthlessness of the rights prior to a triggering event is thus obvious.  Ibid.
34. See Coleman, supra, note 8 at 2.
35. Examples of self-dealing transactions include:  issuance of capital stock of the issuer in
exchange for the transfer of assets by the acquiror; purchase or sale of assets of the issuer on
terms less favourable than the issuer could have obtained in arm's length negociations; the
receipt by an acquiror of excessive compensation or additional benefits from the issuer;
reducing dividends and a reclassification or recapitalization of the issuer's stock to increase
the proportionate interest of the acquiror.  See Dawson, Pence and Stone, supra, note 16 at
428.
issuer's longterm value over the life of the plan in order to make
the rights virtually worthless when issued33.
When a triggering event occurs, the exercise terms of the rights
change and they become very valuable. Upon the occurence of
such a defined triggering event, the rights become separable from
the common stock and exercisable.  The separation time typically
occurs upon the acquisition of 20% of the issuer's common stock
by any single entity or group and/or upon the announcement of a
tender offer for 30% of the issuer's common stock.  At that time,
the rights usually become non-redeemable.
Upon the further occurrence of a defined «merger event», each
right would «flip-over», becoming a right to purchase shares of
common stock of the acquiror or of the merged entity which at the
time of the merger would have a market value of twice the
exercise price of the right therefore al-lowing the rightsholders to
purchase shares at half price. For example, if the issuer's shares
are trading or have a market value of $ 25 per share while the
exercise price is $ 100, the holder of each right is entitled to
purchase $ 200 worth of the common stock (8 shares) of the
surviving entity for $ 100, immediately making $ 100 per right (a
50% discount).
This result is achievable only where an arrangement is en-tered
into between the target and the acquiror (such as a merger or sale
of assets)34.  If the acquiror engages in defined «self-dealing
transactions»35, then the rightsholders, other than the acquiror, are
entitled to purchase common stock of the issuer at half price (the
«Flip-in»).
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of the Corporation» (1980) 11 Bell Journal of Economics 42.
37. Wilderboer, supra, note 23 at 34.
Finally, the plan also provides that the issuer shall not engage in
transactions that will trigger the Flip-over or Flip-in features
unless there are adequate provisions made to honour the rights.
The Household-type plan works as follows:  if an announcement
of a tender offer for 30% of Household's common shares is made,
the rights are issued and are immediately exercisable to purchase
1/100 share of new preferred stock for $ 100 and are redeemable
by the board of directors for $ .50 per right.  If 20% of House-
hold's common shares are acquired by anyone, the rights are
issued and become non-redeemable.  In such event, they are
exercisable to purchase 1/100 of a share of preferred stock.
If a right is not exercised for preferred stock, and thereafter, a
merger or consolidation occurs, the rightsholders can exercise
each right to purchase $ 200 worth of the common stock of the
tender offeror for $ 100.
This has the effect of substantially diluting the equity of the
acquiror and dramatically increasing the effective cost of the take-
over for the acquiror thereby giving Flip-over provisions signifi-
cant deterrent effect.
Finally,  the bidder also has to contend with what has been termed
the  «Grossman Hart»  problem36 for the Flip-over plan provides
great incentives for the shareholder to refrain from tendering
before receiving the gains provided by the rights in the event of
any «merger event» or «self-dealing transaction».  To get those
rights off the market before the second stage,  the acquiror must
then offer exorbitant prices because of their very high potential
value in the second-stage transaction.  Either way, the merger or
self-dealing transaction becomes prohibitively expensive, wiping
out potential gains to the bidder and effectively precluding a
hostile bid37.
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39. James Goldsmith used a creeping acquisition strategy to avoid the Flip-over rights and to
take control of Crown Zellerbach.  Goldsmith eventually acquired over 50% of Crown
Zellerbach's shares on the open market and took control of the board of directors.  See
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Goldsmith, 609 F. Supp. 187 (D.C.N.Y. 1985).  See also
«Goldsmith's Move on Crown Zellerbach Prompts "Poison Pill" Potency Questions», The
Wall St. J. (16 May 1985) at 8.
(c)  Percentage Based Flip-in Rights Plan
Poison pill plans with Flip-in provisions consist essentially of a
standard Household-type Flip-over rights plan with additional
Flip-in features.  The Household plan contained a self-dealing
Flip-in whereby in the event of an acquiror of 20% of the
common stock engaging in certain defined selfdealing transac-
tions, the holder of a right, except the acquiror, would be permit-
ted to purchase stock and/or debt of the issuer at a 50% discount.
A stronger form of Flip-in provision is one that is triggered upon
the mere accumulation of a specified percentage of the issuer's
stock.  This form is known as the Percentage Based Flip-in or
Ownership Flip-in.  A Canadian commentator has referred to this
type of plan as the «second generation pill»38.  In a Flip-over plan
where an acquiror would accumulate stock of the issuer but
would not engage in a merger event or a selfdealing transaction
with the issuer, such acquiror would avoid both the Flip-over and
the Flip-in provisions39.
Because the Flip-over provision does not operate unless the
bidder attempts to acquire all the issuer's common stock by a
merger or by some other type of business combination, Flip-over
pills do not prevent all-cash tender offers for all of the issuer's
shares or open-market purchases of a controlling interest in the
issuer.  It is to fill this gap that the Flip-in provisions were added
to Flip-over plans.
In the Percentage Based Flip-in plan, defined «selfdealing» is not
required and the rightsholder is entitled to purchase common
stock of the issuer at a discount upon the mere accumulation by
the acquiror of a specified percentage of issuer stock.
The Percentage Based Flip-in plan has become, because of the
greater potency and incentive it provides the acquiror to negotiate
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41. Back-End values typically exceeded market prices by 8 to 92%.  See Office of the Chief
Economist, supra, note 17 at 14.
with the issuer's board of directors, the most frequently adopted
form of plan in the U.S.
(d)  Back-End Plan
This type of plan also known as a Note Purchase or «Put» plan
involves the issuance of rights as a pro rata dividend to all
common stockholders of the issuer, to tender («put») their
common stock to the issuer for a specified amount of cash or a
package of securities (debt securities, preferred stock or a
combination thereof) worth more than current market price
following the occurence of a specified triggering event.
The rights are not unlike those involved in other poison pill plans
(they carry no voting right and they are redeemable for a nominal
sum until they become effective) except that they do not separate
from the underlying common stock.  This type of plan is similar
to a Flip-in, but uses an automatic self-tender rather than an
automatic new issue of stock to dilute an acquiror's holdings40.
Typically, the triggering event is the acquisition of a given
percentage of the issuer's capital stock.  The rights then become
non-redeemable and exercisable by all common stockholders
except the acquiror, through the tendering of their common stock
to the issuer. However, the rights do not separate from the
underlying stock. If the take-over is successful, the effect of the
Back-End plan is to require the acquiror to buy out the remaining
shareholders at a price established by the issuer's management.
The Back-End discount is usually less than the 50% discount
available to rightsholders with Flip-over plans41.  The value of the
securities package or Back-End price may be intended to reflect
the high end of the long-term realizable value of the issuer over
the duration of the plan.  Although many variations are available,
a fixed dollar value will be chosen to project the impression that
the board of directors of the issuer has made a definite assessment
as to the long-term «fair» value of the issuer's stock to its stock-
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42. Wildeboer, supra, note 23 at 37.
43. For examples of different variations of Back-End plans, see Dawson, Pence and Stone,
supra, note 16 at 429.
44. The Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Del.
Supr., 506 A. 2d 173 (1986), while not directly confronting the legality of a note purchase
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shareholders wealth maximization.  However, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(S.E.C.) has indicated that it views such plans as the equivalent of an issuer tender offer.
Thus, plans which discriminate against acquiring persons would be prohibited under the
«all-holders rule» enunciated by the S.E.C. whereby an issuer tender offer must be open to
all security holders of the same class at the highest price paid to any other security holder.
See Rule 13e-4(f) (8) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. s. 78a et seq.
45. Wilderboer, supra, note 23 at 38.
46. See Dawson, Pence and Stone, supra, note 16 at 430.
47. See Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.C.N.J. 1985).
holders.  A fluctuating Back-End price would undermine the
credibility of that proposition42.
The effects of the Back-End plan are very similar to those
emanating from the Flip-over plans inasmuch as the acquiror's
equity position in the issuer is diluted even through an open
market stock purchase which is an important advantage over
Flip-over plans with Flip-in added features.  In a Back-End plan,
the dilutive effects can occur without a merger or a selfdealing
transaction.
Many variations of Back-End plans are available43. However, because
Back-End plans, upon the occurrence of a triggering event, involve an
exchange offer that is not open to all shareholders, they are similar in
financial effects to discriminatory self-tender offers and may be illegal
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  They are thus unpopular in
the U.S. because of such suspect legal status44.
(e)  Voting Rights Plan
Defensive measures with voting provisions involve the issuance
of a pro rata dividend to all common stockholders of the issuer of
securities having special voting powers.  Voting plans are directly
aimed, not at diluting an acquiror's economic investment, but at
his exercise of control45.
There are various forms of voting rights plans.  In one version, the
issuer issues preferred stock46 that grants «supervoting»
privileges47 to all common stockholders except the acquiror under
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51. Wilderboer, supra, note 23 at 39.
specified circumstances for the purpose of severely diluting the
voting power of said acquiror seeking control.
Under another version, common stockholders are issued securities
with voting rights that increase with the length of time the
securities are held48, «preventing those shareholders who sell their
stock to the bidder from transferring full voting power»49.  Also
the securities may carry reduced voting privileges for a specified
period following their transfer.
2.3 Concluding Thoughts
There are thus numerous combinations possible and new forms of
poison pill plans are yet to be invented50.  The decision to adopt a
shareholders' rights plan, the feature(s) to be incorporated into the
plan and the timing of its adoption will depend on various considera-
tions such as the different impacts of pill features.  With the excep-
tion of voting rights plans, general provisions are found scattered
throughout the different types of plans51, such as the redemption
provisions.  Many plans provide the issuer's board of directors with
a redemption «window» of a specified number of days after the pill
has been triggered.  Other redemption provisions have been inserted.
For example, if an acquiror reduces his holdings below a predetermi-
ned level in transactions that do not involve the issuer, the redemption
provisions may be reactivated.  As the board of directors controls the
redemption, issuer's management and directors become important
players in the take-over bid process.
Another provision generally encountered is commonly called the
«out» price provision.  For example, a triggering event will be
deemed not to occur, if a bidder makes a cash tender offer for all the
issuer's outstanding common shares at a specified minimum price.
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The «out» price will be set at a premium to market price but reflective
of the long-term value of the shares of the company52.
Poison pill plans may provide strong anti-take-over consequences.
A plan may be put in place to cause the potential acquiror massive
dilution of his economic investment if he reaches a certain threshold
of ownership in the issuer of rights (the «target»).
The above-detailed features vary in form but have the same
«poisonous» effect for the acquiror.  Whether the securities involved
in the Rights Agreement are common, preferred or debt, the conse-
quences will be the same.
The pertinent distinctions that are worth evidencing at this time
are the discriminatory effect and the severity of a particular type of
plan.
First, all poison pill plans are discriminatory. By their very nature,
even Flip-over provisions  cannot include the defined acquiror, since
all Flip-over plans contain a self-dealing Flip-in feature that excludes
the acquiror.  Such a feature is designed to prevent said acquiror from
engaging in defined self-dealing transactions which do not require a
contract between the latter and the issuer.  If pills were not discrimi-
natory, they would void the purpose they were intended for and all
that would happen upon a triggering event is a massive stock split53.
As per the severity, it appears that since all pills are re-deemable
by the board of directors of the rights issuer, the final issue is whether
or not the board redeemed the rights54.  How-ever, it is easily
evidenced that poison pill plans that give issuer's shareholders, other
than the defined acquiror, the right to purchase securities at a 50%
discount will be judged more severe than other plans which act as fair
price amendments when massive dilution is absent.
Because all poison pill plans are discriminatory and severe, they
encourage the potential acquiror to negociate a deal with the issuer's
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56. See Fleischer and Golden, «Poison Pill» Nat'l L.J. (Feb. 24, 1986) at 17.
57. The Delaware Supreme Court, in upholding the Household plan, demonstrated that the plan
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over proof by giving examples of how it would be possible to circumvent the plan. See
Moran, supra, note 12 at 1354.
management, rather than with the shareholders who usually have the
final say in a corporate control decision55.
Finally, it should be emphasized that shareholders' rights plans do
not foreclose all hostile tender offers and make a corporation take-
over proof. They simply raise the costs of a nonnegotiated
transaction56.  The acquiror can make a tender offer for all of the
issuer's outstanding shares and rights subject to a condition that a very
high number of shares and rights be ten-dered in order to reduce the
dilutive effects of a plan.  The acquiror can also accumulate stock just
below the trigger level and use the proxy process either to pass a
resolution calling for the redemption of the rights or to replace the
issuer's board and then redeem the rights57.
In the following section we will examine the emphasis given to
the above detailed features and the close scrutiny of said features'
severity and poisonous effects by the American courts in their judicial
enquiry into the validity of shareholders' rights plans from a corporate
law standpoint.
3. THE JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT:  American Caselaw
3.1 Introduction
Because of their potential effectiveness and controversial nature,
judicial review as pertaining to the merits of poison pill plans in the U.S.
is abundant.  We will therefore review, for the purpose of this study, only
the relevant caselaw and analyze the main factors which influence U.S.
courts in determining the legal validity of such plans.
Shareholders' Rights Plans -
(1990) 21 R.D.U.S. The Poison Pill in the U.S. and Canada: 147
Background and Legal Considerations
58. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Lenox Inc., supra, note 12.  See also S. J. Scherer,
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The poison pill first attracted judicial attention in the battle for control
of Lenox Inc.58  After Brown-Forman Distillers Corporation announced
a cash tender offer for all of Lenox Inc.'s shares, Lenox Inc.'s board
adopted a poison pill plan59.  Brown-Forman Distillers Corporation
sought a temporary restraining order to challenge the pill.  The district
court refused to grant the order on the ground that such a defensive tactic
was not clearly in conflict with shareholders' interest60.
The second judicially considered pill was in National Education
Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co.61 where plaintiff, National Education Corp.
(NEC), sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Bell & Howell from
issuing rights under the plan.  The Chancery Court concluded that there
was not sufficient demonstration of success of prevailing on the merits at
a final hearing.  The injunction was denied and the parties settled out of
court62.
In both above mentioned situations there was little if any discussion
as to the merits of the rights plan.  The Delaware Supreme Court, in
Moran v. Household International Inc.63 was thus the first to be called
upon to review the legality of a rights plan.  It found the «adoption» of the
pill was a valid exercise of the directors Business Judgment Rule64.
However, the court warned that the «use» of a given plan will be
assessed when and if the issue arises65.  Consequently, the legal roles for
using the pill remain obscure.
The judicial enquiry into the validity of a shareholders' rights plan
will  involve  focusing  on  two  main  litigious  issues:  a) whether the
plan unlawfully discriminates against the acquiror; and b) whether the
adoption or implementation of the plan consti-tutes a breach of fiduciary
duty by the company's board of directors in view of certain procedural
and substantive standards established by recent court decisions.
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66. In the U.S., shareholder approval of the issuance of the rights is not required by law.  See
however, Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407 (D.C.N.Y.
1985) where a New York court applying Delaware law invalidated a time-phase plan as
improperly discriminating both as to voting and as to transferability.  The court stated inter
alia that «change in corporate structure of great magnitude requires stockholder approval
under DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, s. 202(b) 1985» which provides that «no restriction [so
imposed on the transfer of shares] shall be binding [...] unless the holders of the securities
are parties to an agreement or voted in favor of the restriction.»  [Emphasis added]
67.  67 Del. Supr., 378 A. 2d 121 (1977), rev'g Del. Ch., 364 A. 2d 838 (1976).
68. Ibid., at 123.
3.2 The Discrimination Cases
A typical poison pill plan provides that the acquiring shareholder who
triggers the exercise of the rights is excluded from the full exercise of
those rights.  Such discriminatory treatment among shareholders may be
found unlawful or unauthorized66.
Virtually all corporate statutes provide that all shares must be
identical within the same category.  Strangely and interestingly, courts
which have considered pills that discriminate against shareholders within
the same category have reached different conclusions.
Generally, poison pill plans do not discriminate between shares
themselves.  It is the shareholder triggering the exercise of the rights who
is discriminated against for he is the only one excluded from the benefits
that other shareholders are entitled to receive.
In Providence & Worchester Co. v. Baker67 (hereinafter Providence
& Worchester), the Delaware Supreme Court held that the principle, that
there cannot be discrimination between shares, does not forbid discrimi-
nation based on the holder of the shares.  The court stated that the
restrictions were «limitations upon the voting rights of the stockholder,
not variations in the voting powers of the stock per se»68.
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69. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. C.T.S. Corp., supra, note 52, where the Seventh Circuit
held that discriminatory pills comply with Indiana's antidiscrimination statute, which
requires identical rights within a share class, because discriminatory pills only discriminate
among shareholders, not among shares.  See also L. J. Slania, «Dynamics Corp. of America
v. C.T.S. Corp.:  Posner's Plan for Poison Pills» (1987) Wisconsin Law Review 711 at 732
making an interesting argumentative nuance by commenting that «if a poison pill plan
singled out a shareholder and stripped its shares of rights which other shares had, that would
be discrimination between «shares» and therefore forbidden.  But if a poison pill plan was
designed to strip the rights from any shareholder if that shareholder acquired a certain
percentage of stock, that would be discrimination between «shareholders» and therefore
allowed».
70. Harvard Industries v. Tyson, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C.C.H.) ¶¶ 93,
064, 95,294 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 1986).
71. Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 847-48 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part
and vacated in part on other grounds 811 F. 2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987).
72. It is not certain that Delaware law would follow the reasoning set forth in Providence &
Worchester for a Delaware Court has never addressed the problem of discrimination directly.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, supra, note 44 [hereinafter Revlon], the
court stated in dicta that Revlon's Note Purchase Plan, which provided note purchase rights
to all shareholders, except the person whose 20% stock accumulation triggered the rights,
was lawful discrimination.  The plan was held valid on the ground that there was a
reasonable purpose for such corporate measure.  The Moran decision is not controlling law
for it did not examine the discriminatory effect of the Household pill finding the Flip-over
provision to be non-discriminatory by its very nature.  See infra, note 78.  See also Unilever
Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., supra, note 66, and accompanying text.
73. This distinction is evidenced by one particular author, see e.g., Wildeboer, supra, note 23
at 59.
74. 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) aff'd 825 F. 2d 634 (2nd Cir. 1987).
75. Transcript of Oral Opinion (N.Y. Sup. ct. July 6, 1988), aff'd, No. 34386 (N.Y. App. Div.
Oct. 4, 1988).
This line of reasoning has been accepted by courts interpreting the
laws of the following states:  Indiana69, Michigan70, Minnesota71 and
Delaware72.
However, this approach has not been accepted by courts interpreting
state laws of New Jersey, Colorado, Wisconsin and New York.  It is thus
fair at this time to conclude that the legality of a poison pill plan depends
to some extent on the state of incorporation of the company adopting the
plan.  The discrimination issue has been at the heart of a number of
decisions invalidating poison pill plans.  The decisions finding illegal
discrimination are usually grouped into the three following categories:
economic effect, transferability and voting73.
The two principal cases in the first category are Amalgamated Sugar
Co. v. NL Industries Inc.74, (hereinafter Amalgamated Sugar) and Bank
of New York Co. Inc. v. Irving Bank Corp.75, (hereinafter Irving Bank).
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76. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 7-1 (West 1969).
77. Supra, note 12.
78. See text, supra, section 2.3: Concluding Toughts.  It is submitted that all pills are
discriminatory and must be so to attain the results that they are created to achieve.  The
Household pill did contain a self-dealing Flip-in provision but in the court's view, one reason
why the Household pill was held legal was that it left a strategic gap in the target's defense
against a potential take-over bid.  The Household pill was a «first generation pill» and if no
defined merger event or self-dealing transactions occurred than neither the Flip-over nor the
Flip-in provision would be triggered.  The Flip-in plan in Amalgamated Sugar was a
«second generation pill» and contained a «percentage-based trigger» and the only
accumulation of stock to a given percentage was sufficient to trigger the poisonous effect of
the pill.  No «merger event» or «self-dealing transaction» were needed.
79. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 501(c).  Section 501(c) states that «subject to the designations,
relative rights, preferences and limitations applicable to separate series, each share shall be
equal to every other share in the same class».  Transcript of Oral Opinion at 8.
In Amalgamated Sugar, the target, NL Industries (NLI), adopted a
Household-type pill.  After NLI refused to redeem the rights, Amalgama-
ted Sugar triggered the rights and sought injunctive relief in order to
enjoin NLI's pill.  The injunction was granted by the District Court of
New York which held the NLI plan, and in particular the Flip-in
provision, to be ultra vires as a matter of New Jersey law. Amalgamated
Sugar's main argument was that the plan discriminated among sharehol-
ders of the same class or series in violation of the New Jersey's Business
Corporations Act76.  The court agreed with Amalgamated Sugar's
pretentions and held that the Flip-in provision, by diluting only the
acquiring shareholder's holdings, created an illegal disparity of treatment
among shareholders.  The court rejected NLI's argument that the rule in
Moran v. Household International Inc.77 should apply on the ground that
the Household pill only contained a Flip-over provision which is no
discriminatory by nature78.  The court placed importance on the severity
of the discriminatory effect of the NLI's plan and emphasized the fact that
«no one in his right mind will ever tender».
In Irving Bank, the Bank of New York (BNY) brought a motion
seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining Irving Bank (IBC) from
enforcing the Flip-in provision of its rights agreement that was adopted
by the board of IBC, on May 19, 1988.  BNY sought a conclusion that the
Flip-in amendment was ultra vires as a matter of New York law.
Section 501 of the New York's Business Corporation Law79 directs
that all shares in the same class shall be equal.
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80. Supra, note 74.
81. Citing approvingly the New York Court of Appeals in Febland v. Two Trees Management
Co., 66 N.Y. 2d, 556 which had previously judicially considered s. 501(c) of N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law.
82. See supra, note 67.
83. 621 F. Supp. 1252 (D.C.N.Y. 1985).
84. Ibid. at 1257-1259.
85. See supra, note 72.
Following Amalgamated Sugar80, the Supreme Court of New York
held that the express prohibition against discrimination in s. 501(c) may
not be avoided by using a provision in the company's certificate of
incorporation.  It stated that s. 501(c) was intended «not to prescribe a
distinction between shareholders81» and rejected the principle set out in
Providence & Worchester82.
In the second discrimination category concerning restrictions as to the
transferability of the stock, the leading case is Minstar Ac-quiring Corp.
v. AMF, Inc.83 (hereinafter Minstar) where the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, interpreting New Jersey law, enjoined a
rights plan which provided that only shareholders who had originally
received the rights to dividends would be allowed to exercise the
conversion privilege set forth in the rights plan.
In Minstar, the board's goal was to ensure that nontendering sharehol-
ders would receive a fair value for their shares in the event of a hostile
take-over.  The plan provided for the distribution of a dividend in the
form of a right to exchange, upon a defined triggering event, their shares
for subordinated debentures.  The rights were not transferable.  The
shareholders could not trade these rights without the underlying stock nor
transfer them separately after the occurrence of the triggering event.
The court thus enjoined the plan on two basis.  Firstly, the fact that
only those shareholders who held their shares as of the date of the
distribution were permitted to convert their shares effectively divided the
common stock into two classes and thus created discrimination between
holders of the same class.  Secondly, the nontransferability constituted an
illegal restraint on the alienability of the underlying stock84.
In the third discrimination category concerning restrictions as to
voting, two cases stand out in importance.  The first, interpreting New
Jersey law and the second, interestingly interpreting Delaware law where
discrimination has usually been allowed85.  In Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H.
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86. Supra, note 47.
87. Supra, note 66.
88. Ibid. at 410.
89. Ibid.
90. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., De. Supr., 493 A. 2d 946 (1985) [hereinafter Unocal].
Holmes A. Court86 (hereinafter Asarco) a New Jersey court applying New
Jersey law held in favor of the plaintiff that it was impermissible to have
different rights within a single class of stock.  According to the court,
New Jersey corporate law did not grant the board of directors the
authority to reapportion the voting powers of stockholders within the
same class.
In Asarco, the board's plan provided for the issuance of a dividend
consisting of preferred stock to common stockholders.  The rights would
be triggered if a person acquired 20% or more of voting stock of Asarco
while the acquiror would be the only one prevented from exercising the
increased voting power.
In Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks Inc.87, a New York
court interpreting Delaware law invalidated a time-phase voting plan on
the basis that it was improperly discriminating both as pertaining to
voting and transferability.  The new class of preferred stock, adopted in
the middle of a take-over fight, provided for different voting rights within
the same class of stock dependent upon the time the stock was acquired
and the duration that it was held.
The court noted that under Delaware law, a change in corporate
structure of this importance required shareholders approval which had not
been obtained88 and indicated that Richardson-Vicks Inc.'s certificate of
incorporation explicitly provided that «[a]ll shares of any one series of
preferred stock shall be identical with each other in all respects»89.
The court also distinguished the Unocal findings90 on the ground that
discriminating against a renowned «greenmailer» was permissible but that
the facts in the present situation were different.
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91. See Spinner Corp. v. Princeville Development Corp., No. 86-0701 (D. Hawaii 1986) where
the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii, applying Colorado law, enjoined the Flip-
in feature of the plan but refused to enjoin the Flip-over provision.
92. See R.D. Smith & Co., Inc. v. Preway, Inc.,  644 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. WIS. 1986) where a
preliminary injunction was denied on the grounds of failure to demonstrate irreparable harm.
The court found that plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merit that a
discriminatory pill was unlawful by applying Wisconsin corporate law.  The court compared
Preway's plan with the plan in Amalgamated Sugar and found them to be substantially
similar and followed Amalgamated Sugar's application of New Jersey law which «does not
allow directors to circumvent the anti-discrimination statute».
93. See supra, notes 69-72.
94. See supra, note 66 and accompanying text.
95. Thompson, supra, note 24 at 199.
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 1701.16 (Anderson Supp.1987).
97. WIS. STAT. ANN § 180.155 (West Supp. 1988).
Colorado law91 and Wisconsin law92 have also been judicially
interpreted to forbid unlawful discrimination between shares of the same
class.
Under Delaware, Indiana, Michigan and Minnesota law93, discrimina-
tion has been allowed in light of the Delaware Supreme Court finding in
Providence & Worchester94.  Said discrimination can be a factor that may
influence a court's decision as to whether a target's board breached its
fiduciary duty in adopting a certain type of poison pill plan95.
It is interesting to note that both Ohio96 and Wisconsin97 have
modified their state corporation laws to expressly permit directors of
target companies to issue rights which do not allow the holder of a
determined percentage to exercise said rights hence permitting discrimi-
nation among shares of the same class or series.
3.3 Fiduciary Duties of Directors - The Business Judgment Rule
Cases
(a) The Business Judgment Rule in the context of ordinary
business decisions:  The «Traditional» Rule
The U.S. courts may invalidate a poison pill plan if the issuer's
directors are found to have breached their fiduciary duties by either
adopting the plan or by deciding to redeem the poison pill rights once a
take-over bid is launched.
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98. See Unocal, supra, note 90 at 946 which stated inter alia that «the Business Judgment Rule,
including the standards by which the conduct of a board of directors is judged, is applicable
in the context of a takeover.»
99. Easterbrook and Fischel, «The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer», supra, note 6 at 1194-1195.
100. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805, 812 (Del. Supr. 1984). See also D. Block, N. Barton
and S. Radin, The Business Judgment Rule:  Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors
and Officers (Clifton, N.J.:  Prentice Hall, 1987).
101. Block, Barton and Radin, Ibid. at 9-17.  See also M. St-Patrick Baxter, «The Fiduciary
Obligations of Directors of a Target Company in Resisting an Unsolicited Takeover
Bid» (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 63 at 68.
102. Directors are only precluded from making money at the expense of the corporation.
See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A. 2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964) [hereinafter Cheff], stating that
«the mere fact that some [...] directors were substantial shareholders does not create a
personal pecuniary interest in the decisions made by the board of directors, since all
shareholders would presumably share the benefit flowing to the substantial sharehol-
der».
As fiduciaries to the corporation and its shareholders directors have
a duty to act with due care and in good faith.  As such, corporate directors
enjoy the protection of the Business Judgment Rule which is a Common
Law doctrine that, at least outside the realm of tender offers98, insulates
managerial decisions from judicial scrutiny99.  The Business Judgment
Rule is a presumption which provides that: in making a business decision,
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and with the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company100.
The Business Judgment Rule consists of the five following elements
having to be satisfied for the Rule to apply101:
«(1) the directors exercised a business judgment, in that there was an
affirmative act by the directors as opposed to inaction (although a
conscious decision to refrain from acting may be a valid exercise of
business judgment);
(2) the directors did not have a personal interest in the challenged directorial
action102;
(3) the directors made a reasonable effort to ascertain and consider all information
relevant to their action;
(4) the directors acted with the belief that their action was in the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders; and
(5) the directors' action did not constitute gross overreaching or abuse of discre-
tion.»
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103. Some commentators have suggested the following justifications for the Business
Judgment Rule:  first, the Business Judgment Rule allows directors the freedom to
formulate effective corporate policy.  Second, the Business Judgment Rule encourages
competent people to become directors by alleviating their fear of personal liability for
honest mistakes in judgment.  Third, the Business Judgment Rule relieves courts of the
burden of second guessing complex corporate decisions, a task for which courts often
lack the necessary expertise, information and time.  The Business Judgment Rule thus
articulates the principle that although shareholders have a right to expect their directors
to exercise due care and undivided loyalty to the corporation, they cannot expect
directors to guarantee the success of their decisions.  See Notes, «Exclusionary Tender
Offers:  A Reasonably Formulated Takeover Defense or a Discriminatory Attempt to
Retain Control?» (1986) 20 Georgia Law Review 627 at 658, n. 139.
104. See Gilson, «A Structural Approach to Corporations:  the Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers» supra, note 6 at 821-831.
105. See Notes, «False Halo:  The Business Judgment Rule in Corporate Control Contests»
(1988) 66 Texas Law Review 843 at 848-849.
106. Ibid. at 848.
Unless a plaintiff, challenging the directors' decisions, can rebut this
presumption and show evidence that the directors had a disqualifying
self-interest in the transaction, the courts will refrain from reviewing the
substance of the decision103.  Judicial inquiry ends when the directors
demonstrate that they have taken the procedural steps necessary to
guarantee informed decisions.
The «Traditional» Business Judgment Rule recognizes that ordinary
business decisions are better made in the boardroom than in the courtro-
om.  However, in take-over cases, instead of automatically applying the
«Traditional» Business Judgment Rule, courts have begun to scrutinize
very carefully whether the directors of a corporation implementing a take-
over defense mechanism have respected their fiduciary duties toward the
corporation and its shareholders.  Some authors have suggested that the
Business Judgment Rule has no place in the context of corporate control
for such transactions involve inherent conflict of interest between the
directors' loyalty to shareholders interests and their own desire to retain
control104.
(b) The Business Judgment Rule in the context of corporate
control decisions : The «Modified» Rule
Two important characteristics distinguish corporate control decisions
from ordinary business decisions105.  First, corporate control decisions
affect shareholders' interests in making personal investment decisions that
each shareholder has an interest in making independently without relying
on their directors106.  Second, is the inherent conflict of interest that
directors, especially inside or management directors, face when confron-
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107. Ibid. at 849.
108. See Bennett v. Propp, 187 A. 2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962) [hereinafter Bennett].  «When
a threat to control is involved», the Delaware Supreme Court felt that «directors are of
necessity confronted with a conflict of interest».  Thus, the burden of proof «should be
on the directors to justify such a purchase as one primarily in the corporate interest».
See also Cheff, supra, note 102 at 554 citing Bennett approvingly and the dissenting
opinions in Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F. 2d 287 (1980) and Panter v. Marshall Field
& Co., 646 F. 2d 271 (1981) [hereinafter Panter] where majority opinions applied the
sole or primary motive test and evoked strong dissentions.  See particularly the
dissenting opinion of Cudahy J. in Panter criticizing the majority for providing target
directors with a virtually «irrebuttable presumption of sound business judgment,
prevailing over everything but the elusive hobgoblins of fraud, bad faith or abuse of
discretion», at 299.
109. Supra, note 102.
110. Supra, note 108.
111. Supra, note 102 at 554, citing Bennett.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
ted by a take-over attempt107.  Directors may be inclined to resist a take-
over bid to preserve control108.
The Cheff case109 involved a corporation purchasing its own shares as
a defensive tactic against a minority shareholder interested in gaining
control of the corporation to liquidate its assets.  The Cheff case followed
the reasoning of Bennett110 in which the requirement that directors in a
struggle for control bear the initial burden of proving that their actions
have a proper business purpose was first formulated.
The Cheff court noted that where there is a struggle for control,
«directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an
objective decision is difficult»111.  The board had to demonstrate that it
had sincerely believed that buying out the dissident shareholder was
«necessary to maintain what the board believed to be proper business
practices»112.
However, the traditional discretion afforded to directors was not
altered for if directors carry a burden of proof, their decision will not be
modified «even though hindsight indicates the decision was not the wisest
course»113.  The court found that the board's decision was an informed one
and should be given deference.
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114. R.J. Gilson and R. Kraakman, «Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics:
Is there Substance to Proportionality Review?» (1989) 44 The Business Lawyer 247 at
249.
115. Supra, note 102 at 555.
116. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., supra, note
2 was actually the first court to question the application of the Business Judgment Rule
under Cheff's policy conflict/primary purpose test.  Applying New York law, the court
found self-dealing on the part of the Norlin board.  Plaintiffs made a prima facie
showing that the Norlin directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by adopting
a defensive take-over tactic designed to perpetuate the board's control over the
corporation.  Given this initial demonstration of self-dealing or bad faith is demonstra-
ted, «the duty of loyalty supersedes the duty of care, and the burden shifts to the
directors to "prove that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation"», at
265.  The court thus superimposed the duty of loyalty onto the Business Judgment Rule
by requiring the board to establish the «independent» legitimacy of the actions taken
instead of the more easily met «legitimate» business purpose of the Bennett and Cheff
era.
117. Unocal, supra, note 90 at 955.
118. Ibid. at 946.
The Cheff court formulated a policy conflict/primary purpose test114
whereby the directors satisfy their burden of proof by showing good faith
and reasonable investigation; «the directors will not be penalized for an
honest mistake of judgment, if the judgment ap-peared reasonable at the
time the decision was made»115.  Cheff's motive analysis thus gave target
companies directors large discretion to block take-over bids that lasted for
two decades until the Delaware Supreme Court moved toward a standard
of judicial review in a trilogy of decisions handed down in 1985 and early
1986116 which contemplated a genuine effort to distinguish defensive
tactics that might benefit shareholders from suspect tactics designed to
entrench management.
These decisions strengthened the Cheff standard by imposing a second
step requiring the defensive tactics to face proportionality review.
Defensive measures must be «reasonable in relation to the threat
posed»117 notwithstanding the motives of their authors.
(i) Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co.118
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court imposed the enhanced duty,
on a board of directors facing a take-over bid, to satisfy the initial burden
of proving the reasonableness of its decision to oppose the bid:
«Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there
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119. Ibid. at 954-955.
120. Ibid. at 947.
121. In Unocal the court was impressed by the fact that outside directors met separately with
accountants and lawyers to consider the tender offer before voting to approve the
defensive measure.  The approval of outside directors created a sufficient presumption
that the measure was fair enough for the court to decline further scrutiny.
122. Supra, note 12.
123. Ibid. at 1348.
is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination of the threshold before
the protections of the business judgment rule may be confered.
[...]
In the face of this inherent conflict, directors must show that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed [...].
However they satisfy that burden «by showing good faith and reasonable
investigation119 [...]» [Emphasis added]
To come within the ambit of the Business Judgment Rule, the
defensive measure [here a self-tender offer] must also be reasonable in
relation to the threat posed120.
Once the board of directors meets these requirements, the Business
Judgment Rule will receive application to protect the board's defensive
measure.
The court thus engaged in a thorough review of the directors' decision
making process and motives.  Since the court was con-vinced that the
board had taken adequate steps to ensure an informed business judgment,
the court deferred without an extensive examination of the defensive
measure121.
(ii)  Moran v. Household International Inc.122
The Moran decision followed the Unocal analysis in the first judicial
test of the poison pill.  The Delaware Supreme Court upheld a decision
rendered by the Chancery Court on the grounds that the adoption of
Household's shareholders' rights plan under which shareholders had the
right to purchase $200 worth of the acquiror's stock for $100 in the event
of a take-over was a «legitimate exercise of business judgment by
Household»123.
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124. Before addressing the fiduciary duty issue, the court found that (1) the Delaware
General Corporation Law gave the board the power to implement the pill. Ibid. at 1351-
1353.  (2) Shareholder approval was not necessary to implement the pill because it dit
not change Household's fundamental structure pointing out that the rights inhibited but
did not preclude a hostile bid, at 1354.  (3) The pill did not restrict a shareholder's
ability to conduct a proxy context, at 1355.
125. Ibid. at 1356.
126. The Court applied the standard set out in Smith v. Van Gorkom, Del. Supr., 488 A. 2d
858 (1985) where one of the issues in the case was whether the board had approved the
transaction on an informed basis and where the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
board had breached its duty of care even though the transaction involved a substantial
premium to market price.
127. Supra, note 12 at 1350.
In Moran, the court extended the Unocal analysis to a situation in
which the board of directors took action even though no actual tender
offer had been made.  The suit to invalidate the plan was not filed by a
bidder but by a dissenting board member and Household shareholder.
The court concluded that the board did not breach any fiduciary  duties124
and  found  that  the  directors  had  reasonable grounds for believing
Household was vulnerable to bust-up take-overs and coercive acquisition
techniques, and that the shareholders' rights plan was a reasonable
defensive mechanism.
However, because the poison pill defensive measure resulted in
transferring power from the shareholders to management, the Moran
court exhibited more interest than it had in Unocal in both the merit of
the directors' evaluation of the threat and the reasonableness of the
defensive measure.
The court noted that the board's ability to satisfy the initial burden of
proof was materially enhanced by the fact that a majority of the board
consisted of outside, independent directors125.  A decision by a board
composed of a majority of outside directors rein-forces the presumption
that said board acted in good faith.
The court also expressed the view that, because the directors were not
acting under the pressure of a hostile tender offer but pursuant to a
reasonable and informed126 analysis of the issues, application of the
Business Judgment Rule was even more appropriate127.
In upholding the poison pill plan, the court noted that when a bidder
actually presents a tender offer and requests the board to redeem the
rights, the board will be under the same fiduciary duty to base its
redemption decision as when it decided to adopt the plan.  The decision
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128. Ibid. at 1354.
129. Ibid. at 1357.
130. Revlon, Supra, note 44.
131. Ibid.
whether to redeem the poison pill plan will be eva-luated under the same
criteria that were originally used by the court to evaluate the board's
initial decision to adopt the plan128.
The Delaware Supreme Court even though it held as valid the
«adoption» of a poison pill, warned that the «use» or «operation» of a pill
may not be treated equally:
«While we conclude for present purposes that the Household directors are
protected by the business judgment rule, that does not end the matter.  The
ultimate response to an actual takeover bid must be judged by the directors'
actions at that time, and nothing we say here relieves them of their basic
fundamental duties to the corporation and its stockholders [citations omitted].
Their use of the Plan will be evaluated when and if the issue arises»129.
The issue did arise in the Revlon take-over bid by Pantry Pride130.
(iii) Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc.131
The Delaware Supreme Court found that Revlon Inc. (Revlon), who
was the subject of a tender offer by Pantry Pride, had an informed basis
for believing that the offer was inadequate, that it would be financed by
«junk bonds» and that if the offer were successful, it would probably lead
to the eventual break-up of the corporation.
The court thus found that the poison pill was initially justified to
strengthen Revlon's bargaining power.  The focus of the court was thus
on the pill's use or operation.
The Revlon board also entered into a «lock-up» option and a no-shop
agreement with a «white knight».  The court found that such an agree-
ment was not protected by the Business Judgment Rule since by granting
a «lock-up» option the board commits itself to a break-up and sale of the
company's assets which is inconsistent with the preservation rationale
behind the initial adoption of the poison pill plan.
The enjoinment of the «lock-up» option is relevant to the study of
poison pills for, the use of defensive measures to prevent a sale of the
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132. Ibid. at 182.
133. Ibid. at 184.
134. Ibid. at 178.
135. Ibid. at 184.  The court stated that no interests other than those of the shareholders can
be considered when there is an active bidding process in progress.  The court also noted
that a «lock-up» provision is not illegal per se; some «lock-ups» benefit the sharehol-
ders by inducing a bidder to compete for control of the company. Such tactics are
harmful, however, where the plan precludes bidders from competing, at 183. [Emphasis
added]
136. Ibid. at 182.  Two subsequent decisions have reaffirmed and expanded the Revlon
principle.  See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corporation, 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) and
Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Industries Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (C.C.H.) ¶ 93, 502 (Del. Ch. 1987). But see Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak
Corporation, 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987) where the Southern District Court of
Ohio limited the scope of the Revlon principle by holding that the target board's
authorization of management to explore a variety of defensive measures, including the
possible sale of the company, did not establish the board's duty of auctioneer.  In
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corporation, Del. Supr., 535 A. 2d 1334 (1987)
the Newmont directors entered into a standstill agreement with a third party to avoid
Ivanhoe's hostile take-over attempt.  The court concluded that Revlon did not apply
because the board did not «sell» the corporation for the third party only acquired a
minority position from private sellers and did not gain control of the corporation's
board.  See also B. Reder, «the Obligation of a Director of a Delaware Corporation to
Act as an Auctioneer» (1989) 44 the Business Lawyer 275 interpreting Revlon to the
effect that the board should become an auctioneer only when it is clear that the target
is to be broken up and its effectiveness destroyed. In Black & Decker Corp. v.
American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988) the United States District
Court of Delaware expanded the reach of the Revlon principle in recognizing that a
change in control through recapitalization may be equivalent to a «sale» and trigger the
directors duty to obtain the highest price possible for the shareholders.  The Recapitali-
zation Plan included a Poison Pill Plan and an Employee Stock Ownership Plan that
had the effect of ensuring American Standard Management's control over a majority of
the common stock of the company.  It was held that the change in control amounted to
a sale. The duty of directors to act as auctioneer is also evidenced in C.R.T.F. Corp. v.
Federated Dep't Stores, supra, note 13 where the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York observed that even during an auction, a poison pill plan
corporation is improper and the court held that once the corporation is for
sale, the directors' duty changes «from defenders of the corporate bastion
to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at
a sale of the company»132.
The court found that the no-shop clause effectively prohibited
negotiations with all other prospective acquirors, thereby impeding the
competing bidding process133. The «lock-up» option allowed the «white
knight» to acquire two of Revlon's lucrative divisions at a price $100-
$175 million below its appraisal value134.  The court found that it stiffed
the bidding process between the «white knight» and Pantry Pride to the
detriment of the shareholders135.  As auc-tioneers, directors have a duty
to maximize the company's sale price; therefore, defensive tactics must
be designed to obtain the highest price possible for the stockholders136.
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«provides the directors with a shield to fend off coercive offers and with a gavel to run
an auction», at 98, 120. In City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc., Del. Ch. 551 A. 2d
787 (1988) Chancellor Allen commented that Revlon should not be read as requiring
a board to «shop» or conduct an auction process every time a merger agreement is
entered into.  The board's duty is to probe the market for alternative transactions in
order to satisfy the obligation to act in an «informed manner».  The board's fiduciary
obligations can thus be satisfied with more latitude, in ways other than by acting as
auctioneers in the traditional way.
137. Revlon, supra, note 44 at 176.
138. See Easterbrook and Fischel, «The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer» supra, note 6 observing that when directors are looking
at a conflict of interest situation such as a defensive measure to a take-over bid and its
use, the directors' skills are not the issue, it is the directors temptation for self-dealing
which the courts must enquire and therefore the proper criterion should be whether the
directors satisfied their fiduciary obligation of loyalty to the corporation and its
shareholders.
139. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986)
where the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considering whether
a target board had adequately informed itself before adopting a defensive tactic found
that in the particular facts of the case, (e.g., a management led buy-out) the directors
should have been more suspicious of management's motives and had a duty to
scrutinize further into the fairness of the financial and legal advisors recommendations
and proceed to a reasonable investigation.  The court rejected the argument that
directors had an absolute right to rely on advisors.  The director's had failed to satisfy
their fiduciary obligation of due care.  See contra Horwitz v. Southwest Forest
Industries, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Nev. 1985).
Thus, when a board adopts an anti-take-over measure, there must be some
«rationally related benefit accruing to the shareholders»137.  Therefore,
when a sale is inevitable, the enjoinment of the poison pill plan is also
inevitable for the courts believe that the director's duty is to obtain the
best price for the shareholders.  If the pill is aimed at preventing a
prospective acquiror to make a bid, then the board will breach its
fiduciary duty to act as a neutral auctioneer.
The Revlon court thus applied an enhanced duty of loyalty giving
controlling importance to the best interests of the shareholders once an
auction begins.
With the added emphasis on «reasonableness», has come an increased
scrutiny into the directors' duty of care138.  Cases dealing with a proper
decision-making process criteria were subsequently established139.  The
battle for control of CTS Corp. by Dynamics Corp. of America illustrates
this.
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140. The litigation went as follows; in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F.
Supp. 406 (N.D.Ill. 1986), the district court of Illinois issued a preliminary injunction
to enjoin a CTS poison pill.  In Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F. 2d
250 (7th Cir. 1986) the Seventh Circuit on appeal, affirmed the district court's decision.
These decisions are henceforth referred to as Dynamics I and Dynamics I-A.  The board
of CTS, after Dynamics I, implemented a second poison pill which was not enjoined
by the district court in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 638 F. Supp. 802
(N.D.Ill. 1986).  Dynamics still sought an injunction, and appealed to the Seventh
Circuit in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 805 F. 2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986),
henceforth referred to as Dynamics II and Dynamics II-A.  These cases, and others
involving the same parties, deal also with issues other than poison pill plans.
141. See Dynamics I at 409-411.
142. Ibid. at 412ff.  The board spent 15 minutes considering the offer.  See infra, note 44.
143. Supra, note 90 at 950.
144. Dynamics I, supra, note 140 at 411.  The court still reached such a conclusion even
though a CTS «Internal Key Management Group» had analysed the Dynamics bid.
(iv)  Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp.140
In the litigation concerning the take-over bids of Dynamics Corpora-
tion of America for CTS corporation, the Illinois courts, applying Indiana
law, considered the legality of two poison pill plans adopted by CTS.
A) Dynamics I:
Applying the standards of director's conduct established by the
Delaware Courts in Unocal, Moran and Revlon141, the district court found
that CTS directors breached their fiduciary duties in adopting the poison
pill plan.  Three main factors led to the court's conclusions.
1. The district court first considered the procedure followed by
the directors in adopting the plan.  The court found that the
directors paid little attention to the fairness of the tender offer for
the shareholders142 and were more interested in finding out about
other possible tactics.
The court noted that, as opposed to the Unocal situation143
where the directors each met separately with independent
financial and legal advisors before rejecting the bid, the CTS
outside directors have not referred to any independent investiga-
tion144.
2. The district court second consideration concerned the «propor-
tionality» requirement as set out in Unocal.  The court concluded
that the plan was preclusive as opposed to deterring so that all
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145. Ibid. at 418.
146. Ibid. at 413.
147. Ibid. at 418.  The court held that «for purposes of a preliminary injunction, that such
a flip-in plan, adopted in the heat of a proxy contest, with no identifiable threat other
than the vague fears articulated here, is unreasonable in relation to the particular threat
posed.»
148. Dynamics I-A, supra, note 140 at 256.
149. Ibid. at 258-259.
bids would be defeated and not merely coercive ones145 and was
thus unreasonable under the Unocal «proportionality» test.  The
court determined that the board adopted the Flip-in provision with
the primary objective of defeating Dynamics bid146.
3. Finally the district court held that CTS Flip-in provision had
to be based on an evaluation of the company's true value.  The
15% trigger was evidently designed to hamper Dynamics efforts
to solicit proxies147.
B) Dynamics I-A:
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
decision in Dynamics I and proceeded to review the policy considerations
involved in the adoption of a poison pill plan.  The Seventh Circuit
seemed genuinely troubled by CTS's financial advisor's lack of indepen-
dence and objectivity.  Indeed, the financial advisor's bonus seemed to
vary according to the opinion he would render to CTS's board.
Concerning the reasonableness of the defensive measure, the court
stated that such a measure must be «plausibly related to the goal of
stockholder wealth maximization»148.  The Seventh Circuit concurred
with the district court on its conclusions concerning the 15% trigger but
held that the percentage level of a trigger alone is not determinative of the
validity of the plan.  The individual circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the pill are critical to the propriety of the boards actions.  It
was also concerned with the $80 million, high-interest debt that would
accrue if the rights were issued, therefore increasing the risk of insolven-
cy149.
C) Dynamics II:
A second poison pill plan was put in place to conform with the
strictures of the Seventh Circuit opinion in Dynamics I-A.  Again the
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150. Dynamics II-A, supra, note 140 at 710.
151. Ibid. at 712.
152. Ibid. at 714-715.
153. Ibid. at 714
district court had to consider the plan but did so, this time, in light of the
Seventh Circuit's comments on the first pill.  It held that the pill was
properly put into place and did not enjoin CTS's second pill.
D) Dynamics II-A:
The Seventh Circuit, on appeal, this time found three main problems
with the second pill.
1. The compensation arrangement with CTS's financial advisor
caused the court to doubt the objectivity that is necessarily
required from an independent financial advisor in tender offers
situations150.
2. The second pill's trigger was set at 28% which was at a level
below CTS's control percentage.  If such an increased level would
not interfere with proxy contests, the court stated that any trigger
set below the necessary level needed to exercise control of the
corporation had to be justified by adequate evidence151.
3. Finally, the Seventh Circuit was concerned that if a trigger
price («exercice price») was set too high above market or intrinsic
value, it would prevent tender offers in general and go against the
purpose of selling to the highest bidder152 for no person would
dare submit a bid in such a situation.
The Seventh Circuit analyzed the method used by the CTS
board to determine the trigger price which, in its opinion, is
highly relevant to the issuers duty of reasonableness and good
faith»153.
(v) Conclusion:
Even though the Illinois Seventh Circuit is applying the Business
Judgment Rule standard, it seems to have less faith in management
decisions than did the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal and Moran.
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154. Del. Ch., 519 A. 2d 103 (1986).
155. Gilson and Kraakman, supra, note 114 at 254-255.
156. See supra, notes 101-103.
157. See Easterbrook and Fischel, «The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer» supra, note 6 at 1196 where the respected academic
commentators recognized that «Many business decisions are made on the basis of
suggestive but inconclusive information.  Rational shareholders would not have it
otherwise, however, for their welfare is maximized by decisions that yield the highest
profits net of the costs of gathering information and making the decisions».
This lack of confidence is evidenced by the careful scrutinizing involved
in reviewing the procedure adhered to by company boards in implemen-
ting a defensive measure against a tender offer.
The Delaware Court of Chancery in AC Acquisitions Corp. v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co.154 argued that the proportionality test set out in
Unocal and Moran was more than a threshold standard and, indeed,
constituted a regulatory test by which management would be forced to
justify its choice of defensive actions by reference to the amount of
coercion associated with a particular bid155.
The Illinois courts, in studying the facts in the Dynamics situation,
have certainly demanded justifications as to the CTS's board process in
adopting their poison pill plans.
If some commentators156 and courts have in the past claimed that the
Business Judgment Rule was a necessary doctrine because courts were ill
equipped to analyse complex business transactions, the courts in
Dynamics have certainly demonstrated that the need for such pretentions
need reconsideration.
Even though the substance of the decision is left in the hands of
management, the decision-making process consists in a series of complex
business and financial issues to be considered which are of great
substance in themselves.  The courts, when analyzing the «reasonable-
ness» of a defensive tactic are making business judgments and second
guessing complex corporate decisions even though courts usually contend
that they are ill equipped to do so.  It becomes harder and harder to justify
the Business Judgment Rule in take-over situations when courts keep
imposing on directors duties of care and loyalty for every move they
make157.  The «Modified» Business Judgment Rule is very deserving of
its name for it leads a court into a detailed situational analysis of all the
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158. For a detailed study on the role that courts should play when defensive measures are
subject to legal challenge see R. C. Brown, «The Role of the Courts in Hostile
Takeovers» (1989) 93 Dickinson Law Review 195.
159. At a special meeting of more than 400 Inco shareholders, representing 75 million of the
company's 105 million shares outstanding, 72 percent voted in favor of the recapitaliza-
tion plan.  See J. McNish, «Inco majority opts for poison pill» The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail (10 December 1988) B1; see also L. Dingwall, «Inco win pushes pill option» The
[Toronto] Financial Post (10-12 December 1988) 1.
160. The writer wishes to acknowledge the involvement of the Toronto office of Stikeman,
Elliott and particularly of Mr. Edward Waitzer who represented a number of major Inco
shareholders in opposing the October 3, 1988 recapitalization plan and has remained
an active commentator of the poison pill in Canada.  He remains, along with Mr. Rob
Wildeboer also of the Toronto office of Stikeman, Elliott to whom the writer wishes to
express his gratitude for supplying with important research material on the poison pill
plan, infinitely better versed in the subject than is the present writer.
161. See Inco Material Change Report (3 October 1988) at 1.
162. The Caisse de Dépôt et Placement owns over 3,200,000 common shares of Inco
representing 3% of the outstanding common stock.
163. (December 5, 1988), No. 500-05-013354-889.
164. See text, infra, section 5: Concluding Toughts: The Inco Pill.
165. S. Foerster, «Pass the pills for a vote, please, and hold the sugar» The [Toronto]
Financial Times of Canada (19 December 1988) 40.
circumstances surrounding the implementation and operation of a
shareholders' rights plan158.
4. The Canadian Context
4.1 Introduction
On December 9, 1988, a majority159 of Inco Ltd. shareholders have
approved the company's controversial recapitalization plan in a vote that
will have far-reaching implications for Canadian com-panies who wish
to defend themselves against take-over bids160.
The recapitalization plan consisted in the payment of a special cash
dividend of $1.05 billion (U.S.) representing $10 per common share and
the introduction of a shareholders' rights plan which became effective on
October 3, 1988 subject to shareholders' approval161.
The Caisse de Dépôt et Placement, a major Inco Ltd. shareholder162,
has filed a suit in the Québec Superior Court163 to have the rights plan
declared null and void as contrary to Canadian corporate law164.  The
Caisse's court challenge represents a monumental fight for the rights of
all shareholders165.  At issue:  are poison pills in the best interest of
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166. Ibid.
167. See text, infra, section 4.2(b)(2): Justifying the implementation of a shareholders' rights
plan: Regulatory Issues.
168. See text, infra, section 4.2(b): Securities Law Regime.
shareholders or do they represent an act of entrenchment by
management166?
The Québec Superior Court has not yet rendered its decision and in
anticipation thereof, the debate will remain theoretical.  However, there
are various legal and regulatory issues affecting shareholders' rights plan
in Canada and in Québec which we will try to disclose in the following
pages.
4.2 The Canadian Take-over Bid Regime
In the U.S., shareholders' rights plans were developed as a response
to very a different regulatory environment than the one pre-vailing in
Canada167, where securities laws are structured to ensure that all public
shareholders are treated fairly and receive the same consideration for their
shares in a take-over bid context.
The Provincial securities dispositions and, in particular those
contained in the Québec Act, will be examined in greater detail in the
following pages168.  However, the legal and regulatory regime that
prevails in Canada entails us to proceed with the following preliminary
questions;
1) Are shareholders' rights plans sustainable from a Canadian
Corporate Law standpoint?
2) Are shareholders' rights plans necessary from a Canadian
Securities Law standpoint?
A) Corporate Law Regime
Several corporate law issues arise when a shareholders' rights plan is
adopted by the directors of a Canadian corporation such as the board's
authority to issue securities, to declare dividends (all poison pill plans
involve the issuance of a pro rata dividend to the common stockholders),
to allow shareholders to purchase shares at a discounted price (usually
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169. Companies Act, R.S.Q. c. C-38, s. 123.72 [hereinafter cited as Q.C.A.].
170. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 102 [hereinafter cited as
C.B.C.A.].  The term «corporation» will be used throughout the text whether referring
to a Québec «company» or a Federal «corporation» for simplification purposes.
171. Ss. 29 C.B.C.A., 123.12(7) and 123.102 Q.C.A.
172. 27 C.B.C.A. and ss. 48(2), 123.6, 146(3) Q.C.A.  Also known as blank-cheque stock
provisions, they allow the board of directors to fix by resolution the term of such stock.
These provisions are designed to provide flexibility for the directors to issue securities
without having to obtain shareholder approval.  Because there are no restrictions in
corporate statutes as to the directors authority to issue blank-cheques securities, it is
possible to conclude that the issuance of poison pills securities, even though not issued
for financing purposes, may be permitted under the C.B.C.A. and the Q.C.A.
50%), to redeem securities, to impose restriction on the ownership and
issue of shares, to create a disparity of rights between holders of the same
class, to decide who may hold a certain level of ownership in the
outstanding equity securities of the corporation.
Each of the above-mentioned issues has to be examined specifically
and individually if we are to sustain the validity of poison pill plans from
a Canadian corporate law standpoint.  If we answer affirmatively to the
legality question concerning each of these issues, then and only then will
we be able to address the matter of justification as a question of necessity
in a regulatory context.
It should be noted, however, that some corporate law issues may be
justified by specifically referring to the regulatory environment «gaps»
which may help justify certain corporate law breaches and thus legally
sustain the validity of poison pills in Canada.
(i)  The Issuance of Securities
The issuance of poison pill securities has to be authorized by
corporate statute.  The board of directors has a general power to issue
securities under its broad power to manage the affairs of the company169
or the corporation170.
The board of directors may issue certificates, warrants or other
evidences of conversion privileges, options or rights to acquire securities
of the corporation171.  The articles of incorporation may also authorize the
directors to issue a class of shares in one or more series and determine the
rights, privileges and restrictions attached thereto172.
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173. S. 189(1)(b) C.B.C.A. and ss. 77, 123.6, 169 Q.C.A.
174. See text, infra, section 4.2(a)(vi): Fiduciary duties of Canadian directors in a take-over
context.
175. See text, supra, section 2.2: Poison Pill Features.
176. S. 43(1) C.B.C.A. and ss. 81, 123.6, 173 Q.C.A.
177. S. 43(1) C.B.C.A. and ss. 80 para. 3, 123.29, 172 Q.C.A.
178. S. 42 C.B.C.A. and ss. 123.70-71 Q.C.A.
Finally, the board of directors may issue debt obligations of the
corporation173.
It thus seems that corporate statutes do not contain any disposition to
the effect that poison pill securities issuance is limited.  We will however
discuss the judicial consideration of the board of directors power to issue
securities in greater detail as we will analyze the directors duties in
deflecting take-overs in Canada174.
(ii)  Declaration of the dividend
Shareholders' rights plans as we have previously noted contain
different features175.  Virtually all rights plans involve the issuance of a
right as a pro rata dividend.
Under corporate law statutes, directors have a wide discretion in
declaring dividends.  A board of directors may pay a dividend by issuing
shares of the corporation176.  The board may also pay a dividend in money
or property177.
The only statutory limit imposed on directors is the solvency tests
designed to protect the corporation's creditors178.
(iii)  The Discounted Shares
Some shareholders' rights plans allow rightsholders to purchase shares
at a discount (usually half the market value).
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179. S. 25(1) C.B.C.A.  Under the Q.C.A., the share capital of a company may consists of
par value stock.  It is to be noted that there has been judicial hostility in the past
towards the issuance of stock at a price below par.  See North-West Electric Co. v.
Walsh, (1898) 29 S.C.R. 33 and Ooregum Gold Mining Co. v. Roper [1892] A.C. 125
(House of Lords).
180. S. 25(3) C.B.C.A.
181. See text, supra, section 2.2: Poison Pill Features.
182. See s. 36 C.B.C.A. and s. 123.54 Q.C.A.
183. S. 24(3) C.B.C.A.
Corporate law statutes usually provide that directors may determine
the consideration for the share179.  The consideration does not have to
reflect fair market value180.
Theoretically, it would seem that directors could issue discounted
shares as in the case when the rights are triggered upon the accumulation
by a third party of a percentage of company stock and allows the
rightsholders, other than the third party acquiror, to buy shares of its stock
(Flip-in) or of the acquiror or merged entity (Flip-over) at a discount.
(iv)  Redemption of Shares
Some shareholders' rights plans allow the rightsholders to cause the
issuing corporation to redeem their shares (e.g. convertible preferred
rights plan and note purchase plans)181 at favourable prices.
A board of directors will not be authorize to redeem securities if
certain solvency guidelines are not met182.  Also, creditors may impose
covenants to this effect in various debt agreements with the debtor
corporation.
(v)  Discrimination
We have already stated that shareholders' rights plans are discrimina-
tory, for the acquiror who reaches a certain threshold of participation in
the target's capital structure is the only one prevented from exercising the
rights to acquire more shares at a discount and consequently suffers
massive dilution of his equity participation.
The discrimination issue is probably the most critical to the legal
validity of a shareholders' rights plan under Canadian corporate law183.
In a number of U.S. cases, shareholders' rights plans have been held
invalid on the basis that, from a corporate law standpoint, a corporation
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184. See text, supra, section 3.2: The Discrimination Cases.
185. (1988), 46 D.L.R. (4th) 161; (1988), 62 O.R. (2d) 752 (C.A.); (1987), 26 O.A.C. 348
(Ont. C.A.), aff'g McRae J., unreported judgment, S.C.O. January 23, 1987.
186. Ibid., S.C.O. January 23, 1987 at 7.
187. See also Jacobsen v. United Canso Oil & Gas Ltd. (1981),113 D.L.R. (3d) 427,
[1980] 6 W.W.R. 38, (1980) 11 B.L.R. 313 (Alta. Q.B.) [hereinafter cited to B.L.R.]
where the court held invalid a corporation by-law provision restricting to 1,000 the
number of votes regardless of the number of shares held by a shareholder as contrary
to subs. 24(3) of the C.B.C.A.  The court stated that «[...] if voting rights are to vary,
separate classes of shares must be created so that the different number of votes can be
attached to the shares themselves and not to the holders», [Emphasis added] at 319.
188. Coleman, supra, note 8 at 10.
may not discriminate against a particular shareholder based on the
identity of that shareholder184.
In Bowater Canada Limited v. R. L. Crain Inc.,185 the Ontario Court
of Appeal considered a decision of McRae J., of the Ontario Supreme
Court, where a provision in the articles of incorporation of a C.B.C.A.
corporation purported to reduce the ten voting rights per share attaching
to one class of shares to one vote per share when such stock was
transferred out of a family control block.
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld McRae J.'s decision who stated
that «this interpretation is founded on the principle that votes attach to the
shares as opposed to the shareholder [...] present corporate law cannot
tolerate the result that the rights of a share depend on the identity of the
shareholder»186.
It would thus appear that the principle to the effect that there cannot
be discrimination between shares extends to discrimination based on the
identity of the holder187.
A commentator has suggested an argument to the effect that a rights
plan is created under a rights agreement which constitutes a contract
between the issuer and a trustee acting as agent of the rightsholder and
corporate law principles applicable to a class of shares do not limit the
flexibility available in establishing rights by private agreement188.
A second argument that can be made is that rights are issued as a
pro rata dividend and as such, are distributed to all shareholders.  It is
only when an acquiror reaches a certain level of ownership of common
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stock of the issuer that such acquiror is discriminated against.  The
acquiror is the only shareholder whose rights become null and void.
However, there have been situations where corporations have issued
rights or stock options to certain officers that become null and void in
circumstances such as leaving the corporation's employment.
The only difference between such a situation and a shareholders'
rights plan is that in the latter situation the rights are issued to all
shareholders.
However, in anticipation of judicial ratification of such arguments, it
remains to be ascertained whether the necessary discriminatory effects of
a shareholders' rights plan can be sustained under Canadian corporate
law.
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189. It is to be noted that the legal relationship between a corporation and its directors is
governed, in Québec law, by a different set of rules from those existing elsewhere in
Canada. In Québec, a director is not a fiduciary as in other provinces but a mandatary
of the corporation he represents. See s. 123.83 Q.C.A. The rules of civil law mandate
(A. 1701-1761 C.C.) are completed by the duties which flow from the position of
director (e.g. the institutional theory has allowed for the imposition on a director of the
duty of independence which does not exist as a rule of civil law mandate and which in
common law stems from the general duty of good faith imposed on fiduciaries
generally). Also, A. 1710 C.C., which reads, in part: Art. 1710. The mandatary is bound
to exercise, in the execution of the mandate, reasonable skill and all the care of a
prudent administrator ... embodies the duty of care which also serves as the legal basis
for the imposition of the duty to act «bona fide» in the best interest of the corporation
and the duty to act for a proper purpose. A comparative analysis of common law
fiduciary duties and civil law mandatary roles of directors is beyond the scope of the
present study and for the purpose of the subject treated herein, we will assume that the
same legal consequences will prevail. The main difference, between the two systems
of law for our purpose, is that the standard of conduct imposed by Common Law courts
on directors is based on a subjective criterion. However, since the enactment of s. 122
C.B.C.A. this distinction is now obsolete. The second distinction is that from a
corporation law standpoint, Québec directors are mandataries of the corporation and
owe no special duty to the shareholders. It may thus be more difficult to justify
adopting a defensive measure if it is not in the best interest of the corporation but is
only aimed at the protection of the shareholders from coercive maneuvers in certain
circumstances. The other difficulty that directors have to overcome is that their duties
differ when examined from a securities law perspective, where in Canada such rules are
designed to give sovereignty to the shareholders. In the event of a take-over bid defense
decision, where both corporate and securities legislation contain dispositions to regulate
take-over bids, the Québec director is faced with uncertainty as to what is duties entail.
190. See B. Welling, Corporate Law in Canada:  The Governing Principles (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1984) at 714-15.
(vi) Fiduciary duties of Canadian directors in a take-over
context.189
Despite the high take-over activity of recent years, very few Canadian
courts have proceeded to a judicial consideration of the validity of
take-over defensive measures.  Courts are therefore lacking in
Canadian precedent and will be forced to turn to other jurisdictions
for judicial support.  It is noted by certain legal scholarss190 that
Canadian courts will thus focus on the wealth of U.S. case law to
assist them in their difficult task of deciding the validity of both the
adoption of a defensive measure and of its operation.
(a) The Proper Purpose Doctrine
The Proper Purpose Doctrine is a statement developed by the courts
to the effect that directors, in carrying out their functions, must exercise
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191. See Re Smith and Fawcett, Ltd., [1942] Ch. 304 at 306. The proper purpose doctrine
(also known as the collateral purpose rule) involves ascertaining what is a proper
purpose for the exercise of a particular directorial power and whether that purpose was
present in that particular case. Proof concerning these questions is difficult, since the
intentions of the directors have to be examined along with the other circumstances of
the case. As noted by Professor Iacobucci, the idea that every power has certain proper
purposes has become much less emphasized since corporate statutes require directors
to act in good faith in the best interests of the corporation (see s. 122 C.B.C.A.). Courts
may thus be more likely to judge directors' conduct by the standard of «the best
interests of the corporation», and thus will look more to the particular act and the
particular circumstances of the case, rather than relying on preconceived judicial
notions of what constitutes a proper exercise of a given power. See F. Iacobucci, «The
Exercise of Directors' powers: The Battle of Afton Mines» (1973) 11 Osgoode Hall L.J.
353 at 365, n. 35.
192. See St-Patrick Baxter, supra, note 101, at 77 n. 71 citing Harlowe's Nominees Pty. Ltd.
v. Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co. (1968), 121 C.L.R. 483 at 493.
193. (1919), 45 O.L.R. 195 (H.C.).
194. In this particular case, the general manager, who was largely credited for the company's
financial success, threatened to leave his position if plaintiff acquired control of the
company.
195. In Spooner v. Spooner Oils Ltd. [1936], 2 D.L.R. 634, [1936], 1 W.W.R. 561 (Alta.
S.C.A.D.) [hereinafter cited to D.L.R.] Harver C.J.A. toned down this principle at 635-
636 in stating that «...when an issue of shares by the directors for the purpose of giving
control cannot be deemed to be intended to be in the best interest of the shareholders
generally but on the contrary appears to be intended to accomplish some other purpose,
then it constitutes a breach of trust on the part of the directors who occupy a fiduciary
position in which they must act bona fide for the interests of the general body of
shareholders.  It is simply an instance of the act of the directors being at variance with
this duty.  There is nothing in the authorities cited that would stand in the way of [...]
giving someone control of the company if the directors honestly believed on reasonable
grounds that it was for the interest of the company that this should be done».
their powers in what they consider is in the best interests of the corpora-
tion, and for a proper purpose and not for any collateral purpose191.
The proper purpose analysis is applied to the primary or sub-stantial
purpose of the directors in exercising their discretion.  This entails that an
improper secondary purpose will not cause to invalidate the board's
decision192.
In Canada, the leading authority with respect to the application of the
proper purpose doctrine is probably the case of Bonisteel v. Collis
Leather Co. Ltd.193 where the directors of Collis Leather Co. Ltd. issued
authorized shares to existing shareholders for the purpose of diluting the
plaintiff's equity from a majority position to a minority position.
Rose J. held that even if the share issuance was believed by the
directors to be in the best interest of the company194, the evidence showed
that the purpose of the defendant directors in all they did was to deprive
the plaintiff of the controlling position which he had acquired195.
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[Emphasis added]
196. (1963), [1967] 1 Ch. 254, [1966] 3 All E.R. 420 [hereinafter Hogg cited to Ch.].
197. Ibid. at 265-266.  Buckley J. stated that «The power to issue shares was a fiduciary
power and if, as I think, it was exercised for an improper motive, the issue of these
shares is liable to be set aside.», at 269. Buckley J. also cited approvingly Punt v.
Symons & Co. Ltd., [1903] 2 Ch. 506 at 516-517 where Byrne J. first made the
statement that the power to issue shares was given to the directors primarily to enable
them to raise capital, but then went on to say that there might be occasions when the
directors might fairly and properly issue shares for other reasons.
198. (1973) 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288, [1973] 2 W.W.R. 385 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Teck cited to
D.L.R.].
In the English decision in Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd.196, a company was
the subject of a hostile bid for its ordinary and preferred shares.  The
directors responded by establishing a trust for the benefit of the compa-
ny's employees and allotted shares to the trust, nominating themselves as
trustees to secure a position that would enable them to purchase said
shares.  The trust was set up to purchase the shares with funds loaned by
the company.
Buckley J. held that the directors had done so to ensure that the bidder
could not achieve a majority position and that this exercise of the
directors power to allot shares was for an improper purpose.  Buckley J.
reached this conclusion even though evidence showed that the directors
had acted in good faith, believing they were serving the best interests of
the company197.
(b) Teck Corp. v.  Millar198
The facts of the Teck case are very unusual and at the same time very
important in understanding the logic behind Mr. Justice Berger's
judgment in this landmark decision on Canadian directors' fiduciary
duties in a take-over situation.  A careful description of said facts is thus
required.
Defendant Chester Millar (Millar) was president and a director of
Afton Mines Ltd. (Afton), a junior mining company.  Millar became
interested in some mining claims relating to a copper property, the
development of which became the central issue in this case.
Said claims were acquired by a syndicate led by Millar and subse-
quently transferred to Afton.
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199. See supra, note 193.
200. See supra, note 196.
Afton,  lacking  the  financial  clout  to  carry-on  an  extensive
drilling program sought to interest a major mining company to provide
capitals for the development of a particular property.  Such development
agreements between «majors» and «juniors» are frequent in the mining
industry, whereby the major will generally extract a bonus involving
equity interest either by way of shares in the company or by an interest in
the mining property itself.
Millar decided that the best thing for Afton would be to sell some of
its shares to a «major» to raise sufficient money for drilling requirements
without giving up control of the company.  Millar eventually approached
Placer Development Ltd.'s Canadian subsidiary Canadian Exploration
Ltd. (Canex).  An agreement providing for the sale of shares to Canex at
a price of $3.00 per share was entered into between Afton and Canex,
giving the latter a right of first refusal on any future financing.
In the meantime, plaintiff Teck Corporation Limited (Teck), another
«major», had notified Millar of its interest in developing the Afton
property.  However, Teck did not enjoy an excellent reputation in the
industry, neither did it possess Canex's record of successful ventures.
Millar did not think Teck had the expertise that Canex had and chose to
deal with Canex even though Teck was willing to pay 4.00 $ per share.
Having failed to make a deal with Afton, Teck began buying shares
of Afton on the market.  Millar, knowing that Teck was buying more
Afton shares and was coming close to obtaining con-trol, entered into a
second agreement with Canex under which Canex would be fully
responsible for the exploration and development of the property.  Canex
would receive 30% of the outstanding shares of Afton thereby reducing
Teck's participation in Afton from 50% to approximately 35%.
Teck brought a derivative action alleging inter alia that the share
issuance was made for an improper purpose.
Berger J. dismissed Teck's action and refused to follow the reasoning
of Bonisteel199 and Hogg200.  Even though the directors' agreement with
Canex involved the issuance of shares that caused the dilution of Teck's
equity position, the evidence showed that the primary purpose of the
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201. See supra, note 198 at 315-316.
202. See supra, note 196.
203. Supra, note 198 at 312.
directors was the development of the copper property in the best interests
of Afton and not a desire to defeat the control position of Teck.
The issuance of shares to Canex was incidental and an inevitable
result flowing from arrangements of such kind, especially since «majors»
usually require a 50% equity participation.
The facts of the Teck case showed that the main issue was who should
get the ultimate development contract and not who should control Afton.
Berger J. placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that the
directors had no reasonable grounds for believing that a take-over by
Teck would cause damage to the interests of Afton and its shareholders.
He thus adopted the following test:
Directors may adopt an anti-take-over measure if:  (i) they act in good
faith; and (ii) they decide, on reasonable grounds, that the take-over will
cause substantial damage to the company's interests201.
Commenting on the Hogg202 decision and the directors' power to issue
shares, Berger J. said that «The impropriety lies in the directors' purpose.
If their purpose is not to serve the company's interest, then it is an
improper purpose.  Impropriety depends upon proof that the directors
were actuated by a collateral purpose, it does not depend upon the nature
of any shareholders' rights that may be affected by the exercise of the
directors' powers»203.
The Teck case is a clear break from the prevailing English law proper
purpose doctrine and is a definite attempt to follow the U.S. Business
Judgment Rule as interpreted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal
and Moran.  The only difference is that Berger J. places the burden of
proof on the plaintiff instead of on the directors.  The Teck test is similar
to the U.S. «Traditional» Business Judgment Rule that applies upon
evaluating business decisions other than corporate control decisions.
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204. See text, supra, section 3.3(b): The Business Judgment Rule in the context of corporate
control decisions: The «Modified» Rule.
205. See Iacobucci, supra, note 191 at 372, n. 64.
206. Ibid.
207. Re Olympia & York Enterprises and Hiram Walker Resources Ltd. (1986), 59 O.R. (2d)
254, 37 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (H.C.). [hereinafter Re Olympia & York cited to O.R.].
208. Exco Corp. Ltd v. Nova Scotia Savings & Loan Co. (1987), 78 N.S.R. (2d) 91, (1987)
35 B.L.R. 149 (S.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Exco cited to B.L.R.].
209. [1974] A.C. 821, [1974] 1 All.E.R. 1126 (P.C.) [hereinafter Howard Smith cited to
All.E.R.].
210. Ibid., at 1135.
211. See Olson v. Phoenix Industrial Supply Ltd. et al (1984) 9 D.L.R. (4th) 451, (1984) 26
B.L.R. 183 (Man. C.A.) [hereinafter cited to B.L.R.] where the court held that directors
were entitled to issue shares if it was in the best interests of the company.  The court
followed Teck and allowed a share issuance to force a change of control insisted on by
It has been previously noted204 that in situations where a conflict of
interest arises such as when directors have to respond to a take-over bid,
the U.S. Courts apply the «Modified» Business Judgment Rule and the
directors assume the burden of showing good faith and reasonable
investigation in using their discretion to implement a take-over defense
measure.
However, we must bear in mind that the facts in the Teck case were
rather unusual205.  The issuance of shares was not immediate but was to
be effected after other parts of the agreement were carried out.  Teck took
control in the interim period and ousted Afton's directors.  This attitude
of the directors added to the presumption that they acted in good faith for
the best interests of the company206.
The Teck case, notwithstanding the immense take-over activity of
recent years, has been subject to judicial consideration in Canada in only
two subsequent cases; Re Olympia & York207 and Exco208.  It is still
unclear whether Teck presently represents the state of Canadian corporate
law.
In Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd.209, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council distinguished Teck on its facts, which
demonstrated that the primary purpose of the Afton directors was to act
in the best interests of the company.  In Howard Smith, the Privy Council
reaffirmed the proper purpose doctrine in deciding that the sole purpose
of the directors was to dilute the majority to enable the minority to
advantageously dispose of their shares to an offeror210.
The Privy Council thus referred to Teck without disapproval.  Other
decisions have approved Berger J.'s reasoning in Teck211.
Shareholders' Rights Plans -
180 The Poison Pill in the U.S. and Canada: (1990) 21 R.D.U.S.
Background and Legal Considerations
company creditors as a condition of allowing further credit.  The fact that the directors
were also shareholders and made a decision which could benefit them personally if the
shares gained value was not sufficient ground for disallowing the issuance, at 191.  See
also First City Financial Corp. Ltd. v. Genstar Corp. (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 631 (H.C.).
212. See supra, note 207.
213. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, supra, note 90; Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
supra, note 12 and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., supra, note
44.  See text, supra, section 3.3(b)(iii): Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings
Inc.
214. Supra, note 207 at 270.
(c) Re Olympia & York212
The Ontario courts increased the scope of management discretion in
Re Olympia & York in implementing a defensive strategy to thwart a take-
over attempt.
Curiously, Montgomery J.'s decision did not take into consideration
the three landmark U.S. decisions rendered in 1985 and 1986 by the
Delaware Supreme Court and establishing the «Modified» Business
Judgment Rule as the proper judicial test to be applied in corporate
control situations213.
The facts are as follows.  Gulf Canada Corporation (Gulf), a
subsidiary of Olympia & York Enterprises (Olympia), launched a take-
over bid for Hiram Walker Resources Ltd. (Hiram Walker).  The target
board of directors rejected the offer and entered into a contract with
Allied-Lyons PLC to sell Hiram Walker's liquor division.  Hiram Walker
set up a subsidiary (Fingas) with Allied-Lyons PLC to make a competing
bid for the company at a higher price than that offered by Gulf.  Gulf and
Olympia & York applied for an interlocutory injunction arguing that the
target's directors attempted to entrench themselves by manipulating
corporate assets without shareholder approval.
Montgomery J. held that the board had not breached its fiduciary
duties and acted in good faith on the advice of its investment bankers for
the sole purpose of maximizing shareholders' value214.
The court reached this decision by only considering the chief
executive officer and one director's affidavits.  The court did not take into
account the U.S. decisions to the effect that when the sale of company
Shareholders' Rights Plans -
(1990) 21 R.D.U.S. The Poison Pill in the U.S. and Canada: 181
Background and Legal Considerations
215. See Revlon, supra, note 44.  See also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.,
supra, note 139.
216. See supra, note 208.
217. Ibid., at 230-233.
218. Ibid., at 232.
assets becomes inevitable, the directors duty of auctioneers is triggered
and the sole consideration is maximizing shareholders' wealth215.
The court was very interested in the procedure used by Hiram Walker
to achieve the desired result.  The Fingas subsidiary served as a vehicle
to reduce corporate taxation by $300 million and funnel $2 billion of the
sale of assets proceed to purchase 50 million of the 103 million common
shares of Hiram Walker at a higher price than the Gulf and Olympia bid.
Montgomery J., accepting Berger J.'s reasoning in Teck, stated that it
would have been a breach of the directors' duty to the shareholders since
it had reasonable grounds to believe that the intrinsic value of the
company's stock was higher than the offered price.
(d) Exco Corp. v. Nova Scotia Savings & Loan Co.216
Exco Corp. (Exco) made a tender offer to obtain control of Nova
Scotia Savings & Loan Co. (NSS&L) and was at that time already owner
of 49% of NSS&L common stock accumulated from various individuals.
In order to thwart Exco's bid, the directors of NSS&L set about
finding a rival bidder more to their liking.
Considering Exco's already important equity position, finding a
«white knight» to make a competing bid required diluting Exco's
holdings.  Halifax Developments Holdings Ltd. (HDHL) agreed to act in
such manner when the directors of NSS&L issued sufficient shares to
HDHL and other related parties to reduce Exco's position to approximate-
ly 34%.
Richard J. held that in so doing, NSS&L's directors actions were in
breach of the directors' fiduciary duty because the shares were issued for
an improper purpose217.  The sole purpose of the share issuance had been
to waterdown Exco's 49% participation to 34%218.  This represented the
exercise of a fiduciary power for an improper purpose.
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219. Ibid., at 258.
220. Ibid. at 261.
221. See B. Welling, supra, note 190.  The author, after discussing the Teck decision
concluded that : «to summarize, there is no proper purpose doctrine», at 150.
222. Exco, supra, note 208 at 259.
Richard J. stated that the directors power to issue shares «must be
exercised in the best interests of the company and not for any collatteral
purpose»219.
Richard J. devised his own test to discover if corporate directors had
breached their fiduciary duty which, in a refinement proposal from Berger
J.'s test in Teck, aimed at distinguishing from the directors primarily
motivated by self-interest from the directors that are motivated by the best
interest of the corporation.  It also attempted to balance the conflicting
interests of the directors, the company, and the shareholders.
The test to be applied is thus the following: (i) «directors must be able
to show that the considerations upon which the decision to issue was
based are consistent only with the best interests of the company and
inconsistent with any other interests; [and (ii)] this burden ought to be on
the directors once a treasury share issue has been challenged»220.
Richard J. applied such a test to the facts and concluded that the
directors were in breach of their fiduciary duty.  He thus refined the
proper purpose doctrine that was more or less set aside by Berger J. in
Teck221.
Richard J. also commented the approach of Berger J. in Teck.  He
held that, contrary to the factual situation in Teck, there was no manage-
ment decision at stake but only two groups of shareholders fighting it out.
The directors of NSS&L in acting one-sidedly without proper business
reasons to do so, breached their fiduciary duty to the company.  As
Richard J. stated, «in effect, Berger J. found that this was a good business
decision for [Afton] and with that conclusion I agree»222.
According to Richard J. the Teck case should be confined to its very
particular facts.
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223. See Cheff, supra, note 102 and Bennett, supra, note 108.
224. See s. 122 C.B.C.A. which reads, in part: 122. (1) [Duty of care of directors and
officers]  Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising his powers and
discharging his duties shall (a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best
interests of the corporation; and (b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a
reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances. (...)
225. See Teck, supra, note 198 at 312.
226. St-Patrick Baxter, supra, note 101 at 88.
227. It has been suggested that a board of directors can just say no to a bidder if the board
proceeds in good faith and on reasonable grounds to come to such a conclusion that the
bid is inadequate.  This approach has been named the «Nancy Reagan defense» by U.S.
securities lawyers because of the First Lady «just say no» anti-drug efforts.
(e) Conclusion:
The Exco decision has revived the proper purpose doctrine with a
reinforced fiduciary duty.  Richard J.'s test also draws nearer the U.S.
«Modified» Business Judgment Rule by placing the burden of proof on
the targets directors223.
The problem with the proper purpose doctrine, as with any other
motive-minded test, is in its difficulty of application because it is almost
impossible to isolate «the» primary purpose of a board of directors which
is nothing less than the sum of every purpose of every directors.
Also, most corporate statutes confer to the directors' powers in broad
terms without specifying the purpose of a given directorial grant224.
Berger J.'s test in Teck was probably more in tune with modern
company law when he stated that if the purpose of the directors is not to
serve the company's interests, then it is an improper purpose225.
The proper purpose doctrine, if it is to apply in modern Canadian
corporate law of take-overs, should probably use a more objective
criterion considering both the wording of the statutes conferring
directorial powers and also the conflict of interests situation face by
company directors in responding to a take-over attempt.
As one commentator mentioned226, one of the problems with Richard
J.'s test in Teck, which requires that directors decisions should be
consistent only which the best interests of the company, is that no
defensive measure adopted by directors are inconsistent with self-interest
since if successful, such a measure will necessarily preserve the directors'
position.  Sometimes a board may consider a bid to be unfair or not in the
best interests of the company and either refuse the offer227 or use a
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228. See St-Patrick Baxter, supra, note 101 at 88.  The present writer's opinion is to the
effect that Richard J.'s words cannot and should not be interpreted quite that literally.
The words «only the best interest of the company» cannot be interpreted to exclude
other interests such as the directors' or the shareholders'.  They should be interpreted
to mean that only the best interest of the company will be taken into consideration when
courts will have to determine the legality of a given defensive measure.  The words
«inconsistent with any other interests» should be followed by the words «that are
inconsistent with any other interests of the company.»  So as to not exclude the
possibility that a board's decision may also be in the best interest of other constituen-
cies.
229. Ibid. at 90, where the commentator opines that Richard J.'s test fails in not recognizing
the distinction between «inside» and «outside» directors.  (management directors as
opposed to non-management directors).  According to Mr. St-Patrick Baxter, a board
of directors composed of a majority of outside directors should not be subject to the
same burden of proof.  He however recognizes the possibility of a conflict of interest
and therefore turns to the U.S. «Modified» Business Judgment Rule in the case of
outside directors.  In the author's opinion, the U.S. «Modified» Business Judgment Rule
as developed in Unocal, Moran and Revlon which imposes on the directors the initial
burden of proving that «(1) they had reasonable grounds for believing that the take-over
bid presented a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness or would result in
substantial damage to the company's interests; (2) their decision to resist the take-over
bid and their defensive measures were the result of an informed business judgment
based on an evaluation of all material information; and (3) the defensive measures
adopted were a reasonable response to the threat posed by the take-over bid», will
permit a balance to be «reached between the protection of the interests of the
corporation and the presumption of good faith and due inquiry that the law affords the
business judgment of disinterested directors», at 92.
230. See Exco, supra, note 208 at 256.
defensive measure to thwart a hostile bid. Such a measure will necessarily
be consistent with the interests of the company but also with the interests
of the directors.
Under Richard J.'s test, directors will be put in the impossible
situation of proving that it is not in their interest to remain as directors228.
Richard J. did recognize the conflict of interest situation that is
inherent in the take-over context, by shifting the burden of proof to the
target directors but did not distinguish between inside and outside
directors229.
It is difficult to conclude with certainty on the fiduciary obligations
of directors in the take-over context because the Canadian courts have
failed to develop a consistent judicial framework and as Richard J.
himself stated, this area of corporate law is in «a morass of conflicts and
inconsistencies»230 which future judicial consideration will hopefully
clarify.
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231. For a list of guidelines to be followed by directors in satisfying their fiduciary
obligations in resisting an unsollicited take-over bid, see St-Patrick Baxter, supra, note
101 at 104-114 and H.J. Knowles, «Individual Involvement in the Take-Over Process»
in Meredith Memorial Lectures (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1987) 1.  See also F.
Iacobucci, «Planning and Implementing Defences to Take-over Bids;  The Directors'
Role» (1980-81) 5 Can.Bus.L.J. 131.  For an american view see M. Lipton, «Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom» (1979) 35 The Business Lawyer 101.  See also
Matheson and Norberg, supra, note 6.
At this point in time it is difficult to conclude that a shareholders'
rights plan is sustainable from a corporate law standpoint because the
issue has never been directly presented for judicial inquiry.  Also, the few
Canadian decisions addressing the fiduciary duties of directors and how
to dispatch them231 in resisting unsolicited take-over bids failed to give us
the necessary consistency to opine on the legal validity of poison pill
plans.
However, we may conclude that Canadian courts are unlikely to
proceed to a detailed fact-study and modify directors' business judgment
once an appropriate purpose has been established.  Canadian courts look
at the directors decision from a broader point of view by inquiring into
their principal purpose.  On the other hand, U.S. courts are narrower in
their examination and inquire into the reasonableness of directors'
decision, taking business decisions from the boardroom to the courtroom
at the same time, a judicial step that the Canadian courts are obviously
and rightfully hesitant to emulate.
A possible explanation might rely on the fact that Canada's legal and
regulatory securities environment which we will now examine is very
different from the one actually prevailing in U.S., which, it must be
concluded, is more deserving of judicial intervention.
B) Securities Law Regime
In this section, we will try to analyze the prevailing securities law
issues that pertain to the establishment of a shareholders' rights plan in
Canada.
In the first part of this section, we will focus on the regulatory issues
arising in connection with the implementation per se of a plan by a
Canadian issuer.
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232. In the «Canadian Tire» dispute, the Ontario Securities Commission issued a cease
trading order after deciding that the take-over bid was abusive and in conflict with
public interest even though no specific regulatory provision had been violated.  See
Cdn. Tire Corp. v. C.T.C. Dealer Holdings Ltd., (1987), 10 O.S.C. Bulletin 509.
233. See Ontario Securities Commission:  Blanket Orders, Interpretation, Notes and Notices,
Notice re:  Regulation of Target Company Defensive Tactics.  See also D. Westell,
«OSC makes clear it wants shareholders to approve poison pills.»  The [Toronto] Globe
and Mail (9 February 1989) B14.  However, in the case of Numec Oil & Gas Ltd., the
poison pill plan has been put into place without a shareholder vote.  Because the
In the second part of this section we will try to establish the regulatory
issues that are most likely to justify such implementation by focusing on
the differences in the regulatory environments in Canada and in the U.S.
1. Implementation of a shareholders' rights plan: Regulatory
Issues
In the U.S., the operation of poison pill plans has not received the
scrutiny that they are likely to receive in Canada.  The Federal Securities
and Exchange Commission has been impeded in its regulation efforts by
the assertion of state jurisdiction over the corporate governance aspect of
corporate take-overs.  However, Canadian securities regulators will not
hesitate to scrutinize what may be identified as corporate law matters
when certain measures are likely to affect, in an adverse way, the integrity
and efficient functioning of capital markets in Canada232.
Various securities issues arise when a company's board of directors
are considering the adoption of a poison pill plan such as the necessity of
obtaining prior shareholders' approval, the Canadian stock exchanges'
listing requirements, disclosure and prospectus requirements among
others.
(i)  Shareholders Approval
In Canada, all that is expressly required to implement a shareholders'
rights plan is the authorization of the corporation's board of directors.
There are no specific provision of corporate or securities law statutes or
regulations that requires shareholders' approval prior to the plan's
implementation.
However, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) has indicated
that it would oppose the implementation of a rights plan if a majority of
the issuer's shareholders did not approve of such a plan233.  This approach
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Numec pill is to expire after six (6) months, securities regulators decided a shareholder
vote was not required.  See also D. McMurdy, «Firms Arm to Fend Off Predators» The
[Toronto] Financial Post (12-14 August 1989) 1 at 4.
234. National Policy No. 38 - Take-over Bids:  Defensive Tactics (1986) 9 O.S.C. Bulletin
4255 [hereinafter National Policy 38].
235. In the case of Inco Ltd's plan, the board of directors has determined that it would not
proceed with the recapitalization plan without shareholders approval, even though
shareholders approval is not required by law, because of the significant financial
implications of such recapitalization.  See supra, note 161 at 8.
236. See supra, note 234.  National Policy Statements are applicable throughout Canada.
237. F. Iacobucci, supra, note 231 at 161.
238. S.M. Beck and R. Wildeboer, «National Policy 38 as a Regulator of Defensive Tactics»
in Meredith Memorial Lectures (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1987) 119 at 120.
239. Ibid. at 133-34.
240. Ibid. at 134.
241. This view is similar to the English Courts approach in Hogg, supra, note 196 where it
was held that, notwithstanding the board of directors' good faith in believing that the
issuance of shares was in the best interests of the target company, the proper purpose
doctrine should apply and that the fiduciary power to issue shares was not intended to
be used to dilute a majority holder.
is consistent with paragraph 3 of National Policy No. 38234 which is to the
effect that prior shareholder approval of a take-over defense measure
would, in appropriate cases, allay Canadian securities administrators
concerns that such measure may be abusive of shareholders' rights in
specific cases235.
a) National Policy 38236
In 1973, the Ontario Select Committee on Company Law recommen-
ded a legislative change similar to Rule 38 of the United Kingdom City
Code on Take-overs and Mergers which prohibits inter alia company
directors from taking certain defensive measures in the event of a take-
over attempt without the approval of a majority of the company sharehol-
ders in a general meeting237.
National Policy 38 is the result of provincial securities commissions'
efforts to regulate, without prohibiting, company's defensive measures in
such a way that the target companies shareholders' interests are maximi-
zed238.
National Policy 38 operates as a result-oriented policy239 with an
emphasis on shareholder access to the take-over bid decision240.  In this
sense corporate directors who act in good faith to deter a potential
acquiror may very well be in breach of regulatory standard of conduct if
the take-over bid is defeated and the target company shareholders lose the
opportunity to make the take-over bid decision241.
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242. It is to be noted that such a situation would require careful analysis.  See also Teck,
supra, note 198.
243. National Policy 38 is drafted to apply to post-bid defensive measures primarily for there
is a presumption that measures undertaken during the course of a bid are destined to
entrench management.  Certain commentators have stated that National Policy 38
should not be read as an indication that securities regulators have no concerns about
pre-bid tactics.  Such measures may have consequences that, in certain circumstances,
are more abusive than post-bid tactics.  It is virtually certain that securities commissions
will closely scrutinized poison pill plans.  See Beck and Wildeboer, supra, note 238 at
136.
244. See Moran, supra, note 12.  In the U.S. it has been held that a poison pill plan may be
used to spur on a bidding contest or to effectively block a take-over bid. (see Revlon,
supra, note 44 and Dynamics Corp. of America v. C.T.S. Corp., supra, note 52).
245. Beck and Wildeboer, supra, note 238 at 137.
246. Ibid.
247. Ibid. at 135-136.
However, given the result orientation of National Policy 38, directors
who adopt a defensive tactic that ends up defeating a take-over bid,
would not be in breach of the policy if the purpose of the adoption was
to provide the target company's shareholders with a better deal242.
Securities commissions will consider a rights plan acceptable when
adopted prior to a take-over bid and when shareholder approval has been
obtained.  However the commissions will also examine the operation of
a rights plan in the context of a particular bid to determine its conformity
with the provisions of National Policy 38243.  The review process will thus
be very similar to the U.S. courts' approach where rights plans have
usually been held valid upon adoption but very carefully scrutinized to
determine the propriety of their operation244.
National Policy 38 «addresses a significant gap left by the le-gislative
process on the one hand, and the periodic and often confusing judicial
review of defensive tactics on the other»245.  It reflects an attempt to
ensure that shareholders have a say in the disposition of their ownership
rights in a company246.
However, securities commissions should not intervene too hastily
when shareholders have approved of the board's conduct.  Regulators are
cognizant of shareholders incapacity to properly protect them-selves
through the use of the voting process and for such reasons, shareholders
ratification will not automatically subdue regulatory concerns about
defensive measures247.
Shareholders' Rights Plans -
(1990) 21 R.D.U.S. The Poison Pill in the U.S. and Canada: 189
Background and Legal Considerations
248. Pegasus Gold Inc. which was the second Canadian company to adopt a poison pill plan,
has anticipated such a regulatory concern.  Pegasus' plan differs from Inco Ltd.'s in that
it contains a «permitted bid» provision which allows target shareholders at a meeting
initiated by the acquiror to veto, by majority vote, the directors decision to reject the
bid under certain circumstances.  In the U.S., recent variations of poison pill plans
include what is referred to as «Value Assurance» plans.  Mayflower Group Inc. in its
defense of a hostile take-over bid by Laidlaw Transportation Ltd. sought to protect
shareholders from both an inadequate bid and a subsequent failure of management to
raise stock price should the offer be defeated by ensuring inter alia that shareholders
received the difference between the offer price and the market price of the company's
shares during a specified period subsequent to the withdrawal of the offer.
249. It has been suggested that a securities commission could, in theory, arrive at a similar
position by removing the prospectus exemption otherwise available to the target
company, by refusing to issue a final receipt for a prospectus or by refusing to allow the
issued securities to be traded in the Commission's province regardless of the target
company's jurisdiction of incorporation.  See (OSC) Notice re:  Regulation of Target
Company Defensive Tactics, supra, note 233.  See also s. 71 of the Ontario Securities
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466 as amended [hereinafter the O.S.A.] and s. 52 of Québec
Securities Act., R.S.Q., c. V-1.1 [hereinafter the Q.S.A.].
250. See supra, note 235.
There is little indication as to how a securities commission would
apply National Policy 38 in a given fact situation.  It may be appropriate
to design a rights plan to meet certain regulatory concerns which are
likely to be raised.  A rights plan should be tailored to ensure that the
target company's shareholders receive adequate consideration for their
shares instead of discriminatorily penalizing one particular shareholder
who reaches a determined level of participation in the company's stock248.
Securities commissions are however provided with no effective legal
remedy in the event that a defensive measure is in breach of National
Policy 38.  The commissions do not have the authority to require a board
of directors to redeem the rights in order to allow the shareholders to have
the final word in disposing of their stock249.
Even though National Policy 38 has not been a significant factor in
influencing legal advice as to the appropriateness of a particular defensive
measure, it would be appropriate for a company's board of director to
consider the regulatory response before proceeding with a shareholders'
rights plan250.
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251. S. 9156A of Rule Nine of the Montreal Exchange:  Listing and Delisting of Securities.
252. S.19.06 of Part XIX of Toronto Stock Exchange General By-Law.  The TSE's Filing
Committee ordered Pegasus Gold Inc. to submit its rights plan to a mandatory
shareholder approval.  See H.D. Whyte, «Pegasus Poison Pill requires approval» The
[Toronto] Financial Post (8 February 1989) 14.
253. Ibid., note 251, ss. 9156A(1), 9156A(2).
254. Ibid., note 252, ss. 19.06(1), 19.06(2).
255. Ibid., note 251, s. 9156A(3).
256. In the Matter of Torstar Corporation and Southam Inc. (1986) 9 O.S.C. Bulletin 3088.
257. In the Matter of Canada Malting Co. Limited (1986) 9 O.S.C. Bulletin 3566; Re
Canada Malting Co.; Re Molson Companies Ltd. and Ogilvie Mills Ltd., (1986) 33
B.L.R. 1 [hereinafter cited to B.L.R.].
b) Stock Exchanges Rules
Every company that has securities listed on the Montreal Exchange
(ME)251 and/or the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE)252 must give imme-
diate notice to the relevant exchange of each proposed issue of securities,
with the exception of non-convertible debt securities.  In both the ME253
and the TSE254, the exchanges acceptances may be conditional on
shareholders approval if, in their opinion, the proposed transaction may
materially affect the actual control of the company and has not been
negociated at arm's length or, is of such a nature as to make shareholder
approval desirable considering the interests of the company, the sharehol-
ders and the investing public.
In the case of the ME, it may, if it deems it appropriate, require that
the vote of shareholders interested in the proposed transaction not be
counted in the determination of shareholders approval to the proposed
transaction255.
The Southam256 and Canada Malting257 cases both involved rapid
share issuances without the approval of shareholders to non arm's length
parties following rumours that the companies could be subject to take-
over attempts.
In both these cases, the TSE and the OSC did not intervene to uphold
the rights of shareholders under the Toronto Stock Exchange's By-
Law 19.06 even though there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the
share issuances acted as defensive measures for the purpose of retaining
control.
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258. Supra, note 256 at 3095.
259. Ibid. at 3103-3105.
260. Toronto Stock Exchange Company Manual (1986), s. 620.
261. See Certain Named Directors of Torstar Corporation and Southam Inc. (1986) 9
O.S.C. Bulletin 3031.
i) Southam
Southam's major field of business activity is rooted in the information
sector, most notably newspaper publishing.  During the summer of 1985,
the board of directors of Southam received notice from the financial
advisors of the company that a take-over bid was imminent258.  Southam's
board feared that a break-up of the company was not in the best interest
of the public and contrary to «the Southam Publishing Company philoso-
phy»259.
Southam thus entered into an agreement with Torstar, a company also
involved in newspaper publishing, where Southam would sell some of its
unissued common shares to Torstar, therefore increasing Torstar's
participation in Southam to 20%.  Pursuant to the agreement, Torstar then
acquired an additional 5% on the open market.  A ten year standstill
agreement was entered into in which Torstar agreed to vote its shares in
favour the directors that were nominated by the Southam family.
The issuance of shares was done without shareholder approval, in
breach of the Toronto Stock Exchange By-Law 19.06.  However, the TSE
considered the transaction to be a private placement that did not require
shareholders approval unless more than 25% of a corporation's equity was
involved260.
The OSC did not overturn the TSE's approval of the transaction
because sanctions such as delisting, cease-trade orders or retroactive
shareholders' approval would unfairly prejudice innocent shareholders
who invested in Southam and/or Torstar during the period between the
date of issuance of the Southam shares and the date of the administrative
hearing.
The OSC however sanctioned both companies directors by preventing
them from dealing in the Ontario capital market for six months261.
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262. Supra, note 257 at 17.
263. L. Grafstein, «Whose Company Is It, Anyway? : Recent Developments in Canadian
Takeover Law»  (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 522 at 540.
264. Ibid. at 536.
265. Although securities commissions policy statements do not have the force of law and are
not intended to have such effect, we will nonetheless discuss them in the present text
since securities commissions usually expect issuers to comply to such policies.  (See
s. 2 of Policy No. 1.1 - O.S.C. Policy Statements - General).
ii)  Canada Malting
Following rumours of a take-over attempt on Canada Malting Co.
Limited, the board of directors authorized, without shareholders approval,
a private placement share issuance to the company's two largest sharehol-
ders; Molson's Breweries and Labatt's Breweries allowing them to raise
their stake in Canada Malting Co. Limited from 28.3% to 39.7%.
The TSE accepted the notice of the share issuance without sharehol-
der approval because it considered that the Canada Malting Co. Limited
issuance of shares did not materially affect control of the company even
though two large shareholders had increased their ownership by more
than 11%.
The OSC accepted that the transaction was non arm's length because
both shareholders already controlled Canada Malting Co. Limited.  The
OSC decided that even though the control position was consolidated
«there was no material change in their relationship to Canada Malting»262.
The TSE's position in both cases is irreconciliable with the wording
of its own policies and such position stands to deny shareholders of the
opportunity to obtain a control premium263.  The TSE failed to avail itself
of rules specifically designed to permit the shareholders to decide
whether managerial entrenchment affects their right to make the
investment decision of receiving a premium for their shares in the event
of a take-over that harms their personal interests264.
c) Securities Commissions Policies265
The Québec Securities Commission Policy Statement No. Q-17 and
Ontario Securities Commission Policy No. 1.3 require that a company,
that is a reporting issuer, obtains the approval of minority shareholders in
order to create and issue a class of equity shares (i.e. shares that carry the
right to participate to an unlimited degree in earnings of the company and
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266. Québec Securities Commission Policy Statement, August 26, 1986, no. Q-17:
Restricted Shares, s. 1.
267. See text, supra, section 2.2(e): Voting Rights Plan.  See also ME Policy I-10, infra,
note 289.
268. S.52(2) O.S.A.
269. S.11 Q.S.A.
270. SS. 1(1)(11), 1(1)(42) O.S.A., s. 5 Q.S.A, for definitions.
271. S. 71(1)(h)(i) O.S.A., s. 52(1) Q.S.A.
272. S. 71(1)(h)(ii) O.S.A., s. 52(1) Q.S.A.
273. S. 71(1)(f)(iii) O.S.A., ss. 52(1), 52(4) Q.S.A.
274. Uniform Act Policy No. 2-05:  Applications under sections 34(1)14 and 71(1)(h) of the
Securities Act by a company wishing to sell additional securities to its security holders.
The wording of the policy text however leads to the conclusion that the rights offering
exemption is intented to be available to traditional rights offering established for
financing purposes.  (See e.g., s.4 which requires inter alia that a brief statement of the
purposes for which the additional funds are required.
275. Ontario Securities Commission Policy No. 6.2:  Rights offering.  (Addendum to
Uniform Act Policy No. 2-05, Ibid.).
276. See s.53 Q.S.A.  See also ss.107, 108, 112, 113 and 114 of the Regulation Respecting
Securities  (Québec)  [c.  V-1.1  r.  1]  [hereinafter  Québec  Regulation]. S. 108(4)b)
of the Québec Regulation requires information concerning the proposed use of the
funds obtained to be included in the offering notice required by s.53 Q.S.A.  The
comments concerning Uniform Act Policy No. 2-05 apply also here.  See supra, note
274.
in its assets upon liquidation or winding-up) which do not carry a voting
right at least equal to the right to vote attached to the shares for any other
class266.
Shareholders' rights plans that have such features as a voting rights
plan267 involve the use or creation of restricted shares as above-defined.
ii)  Prospectus Requirements
Under both Ontario268 and Québec269 securities laws, a prospectus has
to be prepared by a company that intends to make a distribution of
securities270.  In both provinces, exemptions from prospectus require-
ments are available to a company which issues subscription271, conversion
or exchange272 rights relating to the company's securities to its securities
holders.  The securities issuance, upon the exercise of said rights, is also
exempted from prospectus requirements273.
However, such prospectus exemption is circumscribed by Uniform
Act Policy No. 2.05274 and OSC Policy No. 6.2275.  Such a limitation is
also evident under the Québec regulatory scheme276.
The limitation comes from the obligation of the issuing company, in
the event of a «rights offering», to prepare an offering notice containing
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277. These limitations to prospectus exemption would evidently not apply in the event of a
stock-dividend distribution plan such as a convertible preferred stock feature in a
shareholders' rights plan.  The issuance of convertible securities under such a plan
would benefit from prospectus exemption since such a «rights offering» would not be
established for financing purposes.  See s. 71(1)(f)(i) O.S.A., ss. 52(2) and 53 Q.S.A.
278. See ss. 1(1)(11), 1(1)(42) O.S.A.
279. The initial distribution of rights will thus not be considered as a «distribution» of
securities within the meaning of the O.S.A. and most Canadian securities legislations
which are tailored on the Ontario legislation.  Henceforth, the OSC's position is to the
effect that a rights offering pursuant to a shareholders' rights plan will ordinarely be
prospectus exempted without any necessity for the issuer to apply for an exempting
order so long as shareholders' approval of the plan is obtained.  In Québec, the initial
distribution of rights, notwithstanding the absence of «consideration», will however be
considered a «distribution» of securities within the meaning of the Q.S.A. and an
application to the Québec regulator for an exempting order is advisable.  The Nova
Scotia Registrar of Securities has also rejected the OSC position notwithstanding the
definition of «distribution» pursuant to the Nova Scotia Securities Act which is
identical to that of the O.S.A. and considers the implementation of a shareholders'
rights plan to effect a «distribution» of securities.  See C.S. Reagh, «Nova Scotia:
Poison Pills» The Canadian Senior Executives' Legal Alert, Vol. 8, No. 10, at 114
(January 1990).
280. Supra, note 273.
current and sufficient information concerning business affairs of the
company.  Said notice must be made available to the persons contempla-
ted by the distribution so that securities holders are adequately informed
of the terms and conditions of the offer before the company accepts any
undertaking on their part277.
Considering these regulatory dispositions, it remains to be ascertained
whether prospectus exemption dispositions are intended to apply in the
event of a distribution of rights pursuant to a shareholders' rights plan.
Under the OSA, it may be easier to interprete these dispositions to apply
in such a case for, under Ontario law, a prospectus is required only when
there is a «distribution» of securities which is premised upon the
existence of a «trade» which in turn is premised upon a disposition of a
security for «valuable consideration»278.  Since no valuable consideration
is paid upon the issuance of rights in a traditional offering but only upon
exercise of said rights, we may thus argue in favor of the application of
the prospectus exemption dispositions to the initial distribution of rights
pursuant to a shareholders' rights plan279.
Upon the exercise of the rights, prospectus exemption for the issuance
of shares is evidenced by dispositions in both Ontario and Québec
legislations280.
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281. In the Inco Ltd. situation, the OSC did not consider that the original distribution of the
rights required a prospectus to be prepared.  However, Inco Ltd. undertook to file a
prospectus upon the exercise of the rights agreeing that the exemption provided for in
s. 71(1)(f)(iii) O.S.A. would not apply, though no order for the removal of the
exemption set forth in s. 71(1)(f)(iii) O.S.A. has been issued.  It would be proper to
consider that a prospectus will be required upon the rights becoming exercisable.  See
J.E.A. Turner, supra, note 9 at 30-32.
282. National Policy No. 40:  Timely disclosure [hereinafter National Policy 40].
283. See ss. 74(1) O.S.A., 73 Q.S.A.  See also Ibid., National Policy 40 which establishes
a non limitative list of developments to be disclosed including, inter alia, changes in
an issuer's issued capital, stock splits, changes in share ownership that may affect
control of the issuer, changes in capital structure.
284. See Study by the Office of the Chief Economist, supra, note 17.
285. Supra, note 251, s. 9153 ME, supra, note 252, s. 19.09 TSE.
286. Ibid., ss. 9162, 9163 ME, s. 19.15 TSE.
287. Ibid., s. 19.15 TSE.
In the event of a shareholders' rights plan that contains a Flip-over
feature permitting rightsholders to acquire shares of an unrelated
company at a discount, it seems doubtful that a prospectus exemption
would be available upon the issuance of shares by the unrelated company.
Considering the wide residual jurisdiction of securities commissions
to intervene when rights are issued improperly, some uncertainty remains
as to prospectus exemption at this time281.
(iii)  Disclosure Requirements
It is a cornerstone principle of securities regulation that all persons
investing in securities have equal access to information that may affect
their investment decisions282.  Therefore, a material change report should
be prepared and a press release distributed disclosing the substance of the
change when a shareholders' rights plan is adopted283.  This should be
done even though studies have showed that a rights plan is not likely to
have a significant influence on the value or market price of the securities
of the rights issuer284.
For companies whose securities are listed on the ME and/or the TSE,
prompt notice of each proposed material change in the business or affairs
shall be given to the proper exchange285.
Companies will also give prompt notice to the proper exchange of any
action with respect to dividends or allotment of rights for subscription to
shares or other securities286.  For companies listed on the TSE, such
notice shall also be given to the shareholders287.
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288. See ss. 9163, 9164 ME, s. 19.15 TSE.  See also ss. 638-653 Toronto Stock Exchange
Company Manual (1986).
289. See Rule 9 ME, Ibid. ss. 654-668.  ME Policy I-10: Take-Over Bid Protective
Provisions For Restricted Shares provides inter alia that the exchange will not accept
for listing classes of restricted shares that do not have take-over bid protection
provisions («coattails») to ensure that the holders of restricted shares are not prevented
from participating in a take-over bid on an equal footing with the common sharehol-
ders.
290. See ME Policy I-1: Employee Stock Options, Stock Purchase Plan And Options For
Services and TSE Policy Respecting Employee Stock Option And Stock Purchase Plans,
Options For Services And Related Matters.
291. Ibid., s.1 ME, s.1 TSE.
292. Ibid.
(iv)  Listing Requirements
The majority of shareholders' rights plan allow for the issuance of
rights which initially trade with the issuer's common stock.  The rights
will normally be listed on the proper exchange, as will the underlying
securities288.
Since typical rights plans provide that rights issued thereupon usually
have a term of ten years, they resemble warranty or option securities.
These securities are generally exercisable over a longer period than is
normally associated with rights, therefore it may be advisable to refer to
the stock exchange provisions concerning warrants289.
(v)   The Discounted Shares
Some shareholders' rights plan allow rightsholders to purchase shares
of the issuer (Flip-in) or of an unrelated company (Flip-over) at a
discount.  Both the ME and the TSE have adopted policies concerning
maximum discounts in certain circumstances290 that cannot exceed 10% -
25% depending on the market price of the issuer's securities at the time
of the granting of the options.
The policy statements are applicable to stock options, stock purchase
plans or share issuances which are used as incentives or compensation
mechanisms for persons who provide services for listed companies as
employees or otherwise291.  The policy statements are not directed at
options granted for the purpose of a distribution of securities either
publicly or otherwise292.
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293. Ibid., see also Québec Securities Commission Policy Statement, (October 30, 1986),
No. Q-3: Options, s. 1.
294. S. 88(1) O.S.A., s. 147.19 Q.S.A.
295. S. 94(7) O.S.A., s. 147.2, 147.20 Q.S.A.
296. S. 92(3) O.S.A., s. 147.21 Q.S.A.
297. See supra, note 8.
However, the policies state that the proper exchange may, in certain
circumstances, consider it appropriate to apply the rules set out therein to
other types of transactions293.
(vi)  Issuer Bid Requirements
In some shareholders' rights plans such as note purchase plans and
convertible preferred stock plans with special redemption fea-tures, the
rightsholder is entitled to tender his stock to the issuer for a determined
consideration.  The issuer, by acquiring securities issued by it, thus
proceeds by way of an issuer bid.
Both the OSA and the QSA provisions concerning issuer bids receive
application upon the exercise of the rights294.  If the number of securities
deposited in response to the issuer bid is greater than the number that the
issuer is willing to acquire, he shall reduce the number of securities
deposited by each holder in proportion with the number of securities
deposited by each security holder295 (Pro rata take-up) unless an exemp-
tion is available296.
2. Justifying the implementation of a shareholders' rights plan:
Regulatory Issues
The creation of shareholders' rights plans was prompted by a
significantly different regulatory environment than the actual legislative
scheme prevailing in Canada where coercive take-over bids are not
permitted.  Maneuvers such as two-tier front-end acquisitions and
greenmail are common in the U.S. but specifically regulated against in
Canada.  The poison pill was also designed to give man-agement a
sufficient time-frame to negotiate an acceptable deal for the  shareholders
thus  avoiding  unfair  tactics  such  as  a  street sweep297.
Canadian statutory rules regulating take-over bids form a comprehen-
sive code.  All purchases made by an offeror must proceed by way of the
procedures stipulated in the relevant securities statute unless the
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298. One of the exemptions provided by s. 119 Q.S.A. is for offers made through the
facilities of a recognized stock exchange.  Equivalent exemptions exist in other
provinces' rules.
299. See for examples s. 141 Q.S.A. restricting market acquisitions during the course of a
bid; s. 142.1 Q.S.A. integrating pre-bid purchases made within 90 days prior to a
formal offer by requiring that the subsequent offer be made at a consideration at least
equal to the consideration paid in connection with the pre-bid purchase; s. 144 Q.S.A.
prohibiting post-bid acquisitions for 20 days following the expiration of the bid; s. 145
Q.S.A. requiring that identical consideration be paid to all shareholders in connection
with a bid and prohibiting private agreements that would create disparity among
shareholders; s. 147.4 Q.S.A. prohibiting the offeror from acquiring securities for a
period of 21 days following the date of the bid; ss. 147.19, 147.23 Q.S.A. prohibiting
private purchases by a corporation of its own shares.  See also Québec Regulation
ss. 183ff. regulating going private transactions by providing that a valuation of the
offeree issuer must be made unless an exemption is obtained from the Commission.
300. Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario, para.
3.10 (1965).  See also National Policy 38, supra, note 234.
transaction may be brought within the extent of an exemption from the
rules298.
The rules are intended to protect investors, while balancing the goals
of maintaining confidence and neutrality between the offerors, the offeree
company management and competing offerors.
They are designed to give the offeree shareholders sufficient time to
digest the notice of the bid and their directors response to it; seek advice,
and respond to the offer, thereby mitigating the pressure created by the
offer of a premium price and the limited time frame in which to consider
the offer.
The rules also counterbalance the offeror's informational advantage
by requiring the disclosure of all relevant facts known to the offeror, as
well as the offeror's intentions concerning the target company if should
the offer succeed.
In effect, the rules require that all shareholders have an equal
opportunity to participate when a take-over bid is made.  It is thus
obvious that the regulatory environment of the U.S. which prompted the
creation of the poison pill is quite unregulated in comparison to Canada
where the rules are designed to protect against most of the coercive
situations which may occur in the U.S.299  In 1965, the Kimber Com-
mittee stated that the primary objective of the [Canadian] take-over bid
laws should be the protection of the bona fide interests of the sharehol-
ders of the offeree company300.
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301. See supra, note 298.  See also ME Policy I-12:  Stock Exchange Take-Over Bids and
Issuer Bids; Montreal Exchange Rule Twelve:  Stock Exchange Take-Over Bids and
Issuer Bids [hereinafter R12].  See also ME Policy I-10, supra, note 289.
302. See D. Slocum, «Crackdown on creeping take-overs» The [Toronto] Globe and Mail
(6 September 1989) B1.
303. Supra, note 301.  R12 of the Montreal Exchange has been revised as at September 1,
1989 to reflect provincial securities regulators concern that an investor could gradually
accumulate shares in a target company in the open market without making an offer to
all shareholders and thus avoid the take-over bid premium.  S.12001(1)q) of R12
defines a stock exchange take-over bid as a take-over bid made through the facilities
of the exchange other than a normal course purchase.  The latter is also defined at
s. 12001(1)r) as a «take-over bid» and therefore applies to outstanding purchasers that
hold or would hold after the purchases at least 20% of the outstanding shares (10% if
in the case of a company incorporated under the Canada Business Corporations Act).
Until September 1, 1989, an exempted normal course purchase was defined as a
purchase of such a number of a class of securities that, together with all other purchases
in the preceding 90 days, constituted no more than 5% of the securities outstanding.
As at September 1, 1989, the time frame was extended from 90 days to twelve months.
304. See Ibid., ss. 12002(8), 12002(9) providing that the offeror must provide the
shareholders of the target company with information on the terms of the offer by the
filing of a notice with the exchange to be sent to each registered holder of the class of
securities that is the subject of the bid in Canada.  The offeror must also offer the same
conditions to all holders of securities of that class and is prohibited from making any
agreement that would have the effect of creating disparity among shareholders.
If an offer is made to all security holders through a stock exchange
recognized by the securities commissions it will be exempted from the
procedural steps stipulated in securities statute.  However, the offer will
have to comply with the stock exchanges rules301.  These rules and
regulations arose as a result of a number of apparent abuses of the
exemption which permits an offeror to make an «exempt offer» through
the facilities of a stock exchange.  If the stock exchange rules are not
complied with, the offer will not be considered to be exempted.
On September 1, 1989, Canadian stock exchanges have implemented
new rules designed to ensure that shareholders receive full or fair value
for their stock in the event of a take-over bid302.  Under the new stock
exchange rules, the holder of 20% or more of the outstanding shares of
a listed company is limited to acquire 5% of additional outstanding shares
in a twelve months period.  The previous rules allowed the purchase of
an additional 5% in 90 days303.
These amendments to the stock exchange rules impose obligations on
the offeror who proceeds with a stock exchange take-over bid that may
prove to be equally (if not more stringent) than the statutory procedure304.
The offeror must file a notice of a stock exchange take-over bid with the
proper exchange and with the proper securities commission(s) after
acceptance by the exchange that contains material information about the
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305. See Ibid., s. 12003 which requires, inter alia, information regarding plans of the offeror
to liquidate the target, to sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all of the target's
assets or to make any major change in the business, operations or corporate structure
of the target.  See also s. 12003(o) which requires information regarding the financial
resources of the offeror including the source of funds to be used to pay for securities
tendered to the bid and the terms of any financing obtained.
306. See Ibid., s. 12005 providing that the book for receipt of tenders may not be opened
until the morning of the twenty-first clear trading day after acceptance of the notice.
The former time period was eleven trading days.
307. In the 1988 Nova Corp. (Nova) take-over attempt of Polysar Energy & Chemical Corp.,
(Polysar), Polysar's shareholders ended up receiving a premium of 200% over market
value due to a by-law provision that, although not a poison pill, operated just like one
by restricting voting ownership in Polysar to 25%.  Formerly Canada Development
Corp., a Federal government-controlled company, Polysar's by-laws included an old
government provision giving the Polysar board the power to remove the voting rights
and dividends entitlements of any person who tried to purchase 25% or more of
Polysar.  Through a tender offer of $14 per share, Nova increased its holding in Polysar
to a maximum of 25%.  The 25% rule permitted the Polysar board to orchestrate a $10
per share dividend to force Nova to increase its bid for the rest of Polysar stock.  The
Polysar board circumvented the 25% rule by selling the company's assets to Nova
earning shareholders $14.50 in cash plus half a Nova share for each share of Polysar
for a total value of about $21.  Considering the $10 per share dividend, Polysar's
shareholders received $31 per share, a 200% premium from the $ 14 per share initial
offer.  See T. Corcoran, «Poison Pills can raise shareholders' values»  The [Toronto]
Financial Post (19 October 1988) 13.  See also J. Daly, «The Final Victory, Falcon-
bridge may prove to be too expensive» Maclean's (2 October 1989) 40-41, where
Falconbridge's poison pill plan partly contributed to increase shareholders' value by
forcing Noranda to increase its bid from $23 to $37 per share in a year.
take-over bid that will help the shareholders in their decision-making
process305.  Also, all Canadian stock exchanges have established an
uniform twenty-one days minimum period for all take-over bids to
provide more time for a competing offer to be put forward306.
Considering these regulatory rules, the question that arises at this time
concerns the effective need for a defensive measure such as a sharehol-
ders' rights plan in Canada.  Coercive and unfair take-over tactics such as
evidenced in the U.S. market place are evidently regulated against here.
However, from a target company perspective, there are plausible
reasons for implementing a shareholders' rights plan.  It will not only
discourage hostile bids but it will also provide the board of directors of
the target company with more time to react by forcing the bidder to
negotiate an acceptable deal for all shareholders307.  The general argument
in favor of shareholders' rights plans is that current securities laws give
the offeror an advantage because a company board can seldom respond
to an offer rapidly because the laws do not allow directors sufficient time
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308. In the case of the Inco Ltd. plan, both Canadian and U.S. shareholders need protection.
At the time of the implementation of the Inco Ltd. plan, the time period of a take-over
bid during which a competing offer could be put forward was eleven days.  The Inco
Ltd. board felt that this time frame may be insufficient and leave U.S. shareholders in
the cold.  The time period has since September 1, 1989 been increased to twenty-one
days.  See supra, note 306.  See also Inco Material Change report, supra, note 161
at 3.
309. In 1979, Edper Equities Ltd. raised its interest in Brascan Ltd. to 33% from 5% in two
days through purchases on the American Stock Exchange.
310. See Coleman, supra, note 8 at 4.  See also s. 113 Q.S.A. stating that a take-over bid will
be subject to the Part IV of the Québec Securities Act if the offeror intends to acquire
securities from at least one security holder having a connection with Québec by his
address, his residence or by his presence in the territory at any time during the bid.
311. Coleman, Ibid.
312. See s. 123 Q.S.A.
313. See s. 120 Q.S.A.  See also supra, note 303.
314. See T. Corcoran, «Should Canadian Pacific take a poison pill» The [Toronto] Globe
and Mail (2 August 1989) B2.
to deal with take-over offers or with the arrival of an unfriendly suitor in
order to get a better deal for the shareholders308.
Another argument in favor of shareholders' rights plans is the
protection of a Canadian issuer which may be subject to U.S. style abuses
when a large volume of trading of its shares occur on the U.S. stock
exchanges.  Since Canadian regulators have no direct authority to regulate
take-over activities occurring in the U.S., a Canadian issuer cannot be
assured that Canadian regulators will impose Canadian standards on
transactions occurring outside of the country and a U.S. defense
mechanism may be then a justified solution.  Indeed, effective control can
be acquired from institutional shareholders or arbitrageurs in a matter of
hours309.  «Because of subsequent rule changes, a Canadian offeror would
now be unable to carry out a U.S. street sweep for a Canadian
company»310.  A non-Canadian offeror would likely be exempt from
Canadian regulators intervention for jurisdictional reasons311.
Other arguments in favor of supporting the shareholders' rights plans
utility in Canada exist.  For example, a private purchase from not more
than five holders by way of a block purchase at less than a 15% premium
above market price would not trigger the take-over bid provisions312.
Also, most provincial legislation allow purchases of up to 5% of a
company's shares in any 12 months period without any restriction on the
accumulated total313.  A widely held company could gradually become a
controlled company314.
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In Canada, nearly all publicly-held companies have majority
shareholders and so do not need to formulate defensive measures at all.
However, because of regulatory «gaps» between the U.S. and the
Canadian legislation, a rights plan may be an adequate remedy to ensure
that American and Canadian shareholders receive a fair value for their
stock.  Indeed, when a lot of shareholders are American and the company
trades in the U.S., shares can be gathered quickly.  At the same time, a
slow stockpilling of shares in Canada is possible.
5. Concluding Thoughts:  The Inco Pill
As the foregoing discussion has attempted to indicate, while there
may exist solid reasons for a Canadian corporation to implement a
shareholders' rights plan or poison pill, one has to bear in mind that the
Canadian legal and regulatory environment differs significantly from that
of the U.S. where the poison pill was originally conceived.
A board of directors would act recklessly if it were to import into
Canada take-over bid defensive measures such as the shareholders' rights
plan without careful and detailed scrutiny of the U.S. practices.
While shareholders' rights plans and related restructuring are common
in the U.S., they are a relatively new phenomenon in corporate Canada.
Much of the Canadian financial and legal community took notice when
Inco Ltd. («Inco»), a widely held Canadian nickel producer, announced
its adoption of a shareholders' rights plan on October 3, 1988 becoming
the first Canadian corporation to adopt a poison pill defensive measure.
The Caisse de Dépôt et Placement, a major shareholder of Inco, has
filed suit in Québec Superior Court seeking to have Inco's plan ruled
illegal.  The fundamental issue being whether or not an issuing company
may, from a corporate law standpoint, discriminate against a shareholder
who reaches a certain level of ownership in the common stock of the
company by diluting his position and thus making a take-over prohibiti-
vely expensive.  The lawsuit also argues that the rights plan transfers the
right of the shareholders to evaluate the tender offer to the board of
directors.
Inco announced its plan on October 3, 1988 after the company
substantially increased its current cash generation and earning capabilities
after achieving an improved competitive position within the nickel
industry which benefited from a fundamental improvement in 1988.
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However, while the price of Inco common shares had risen during
1988, the board of directors felt the stock was undervalued and did not
adequately reflect the quality of the company's assets and improved
position in the nickel industry therefore making Inco a likely take-over
target.
The board of directors of Inco decided to proceed to a recapitalization
plan to reduce this value gap by providing an immediate cash return to the
shareholders while also maintaining financial flexibility.
The Inco board decided to recapitalize and pay its shareholders a
(U.S.) $10 dividend per share but feared that such a substantial dividend
would promote heavy trading of Inco stock with many investors selling
out to avoid the tax consequences of the dividend payment.  Such intense
trading would provide an ideal opportunity for a U.S. acquiror to proceed
to a street sweep on the U.S. stock exchanges leaving Canadian sharehol-
ders in a minority position.
The Inco board also feared it could not adequately protect its U.S.
shareholders because a Canadian acquiror could proceed to a tender offer
on a Canadian exchange and exclude all non-Canadians from the offer
considering the relatively brief time frame allowed for a tender offer
under Canadian securities laws.  U.S. shareholders could be excluded
from participating in a tender offer that would have considerable value.
Therefore, to protect its recapitalization and its broad-based sharehol-
der pool, Inco's board of directors adopted a shareholders' rights plan.
The rights were issued pursuant to a Rights Agreement between Inco
and a trust company acting as rights agent.  The shareholders' rights plan
is fairly conventional.  The rights contain both a «Flip-in» and «Flip-
over» feature, which allow shares of Inco or of another person to be
purchased at a discount in certain circumstances and which account for
the rights dilutive effect.
The Flip-in feature operates in the event that a defined «Acquiring
Person» acquires over 20% of the issued and outstanding common shares
of Inco.  Shareholders, other than the Acquiring Person, will be entitled
to receive at the then current exercise price of the rights that number of
common shares having an aggregate market price on the stock acquisition
date equal to twice the exercise price.  The rights will thus allow common
shares of Inco to be purchased at a 50% discount.
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The Flip-over feature operates in the event of (i) a transaction in
which Inco consolidates with, amalgamates with or enters into an
arrangement with any other person and in connection therewith, all or
part of the outstanding common shares are changed in any way or
converted into or exchanged for shares or other securities or cash or any
other property or (ii) a transaction or series of transactions in which,
directly or indirectly, Inco or one or more of its subsidiaries sells or
otherwise transfers assets aggregating more than 50% of the assets or
generating more than 50% of the operating income or cash flow of Inco
and its subsidiaries to any other person (other than Inco or one or more
of its wholly-owned subsidiaries).
If such events occur, the rights plan states that provision shall be
made so that each holder of a right again has the right to receive, upon the
exercise thereof at the then current exercise price of the right, that number
of shares of common stock of the person engaging in the Flip-over
transaction or event having an aggregate market price on the date of
consummation of such transaction or event equal to twice the exercise
price.  Inco shareholders are thus allowed to purchase shares of the other
person at a 50% discount.
Inco's board of directors is given the option at any time prior to the
occurrence of a Flip-in event to elect to terminate the rights.  Such
termination option exists in order to permit the board to negotiate with a
potential acquiror before a Flip-in event occurs and to terminate the rights
if the board determines that a fair price will be paid to all shareholders.
Inco's board of directors is also given the option after a Flip-in event
has occurred, if it determines that conditions exist which would eliminate
or otherwise materially diminish the benefits intended to be afforded to
the holders of rights, to issue or deliver in return for the exercise price,
either debt or equity securities or other assets having a value equal to
twice the exercise price or without charge, debt or equity securities or
other assets having a value equal to the exercise price.
Before adopting its shareholders' rights plan, Inco's board of directors
decided to consult the OSC to obtain the regulatory agen-cy's approval.
Shareholders approval was the OSC's main concern and consequently
Inco proposed to put its recapitalization plan to a shareholder vote and
pledged to dismantle the pill if shareholders voted against the plan.
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315. In contrast, Vancouver based Pegasus Gold Inc. adopted a shareholders' rights plan on
December 1, 1988 without offering to put the plan to shareholders or obtaining prior
approval of its provincial securities commission in British Columbia.  The Toronto
Stock Exchange, where Pegasus' stock is traded did intervene however and ordered
Pegasus' board of directors to submit the rights plan to a shareholder vote at its
following annual meeting.  See supra, note 248.  Pegasus Gold Inc.'s plan differs from
Inco's in that it contains a special «permitted bid» provision granting shareholders
greater rights and less discretion to the board in the face of a take-over bid.  Therefore,
the plan attempts to comply with the concept of shareholder approval required by the
Ontario Securities Commission for the Inco plan by including a provision under which
certain bids would be put to a shareholder vote before the rights are exercised.
316. See C.R.T.F. Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, supra, note 13.
317. See supra, note 3 at 22 «It seems clear that takeover battles should be decided on the
basis of economics, not legalism.  Put another way, shareholders surely know their own
interests better than any judge can».
The OSC did not address the merits of Inco's rights plan.  It did put
the board of directors of Inco on notice that it would be examining
management's actions closely and would intervene after the pill was
implemented if it deemed it necessary in circumstances where the plan
would be utilized to the detriment of Inco's shareholders or in an
otherwise abusive manner315.
The most important aspect of the Canadian regulatory environment
is thus the apparent requirement of shareholders approval for implemen-
ting a rights plan.
However, it is difficult to take a conclusive learning from the Inco
situation in anticipation of the Québec Superior Court decision on the
legality of the plan.  In Canada, corporate law issues, particularly
regarding discrimination inherent in any rights plan may be resolved
differently than in the U.S. where despite the inherent discrimination,
courts upheld rights plans similar to Inco's saying such would provide
directors with a shield to fend off coercive offers and with a gavel to run
an auction316.
A Canadian court, when asked to decide on the legality of a sharehol-
ders' rights plan will be asked to critically examine other important issues
such as valuation evidence to determine whether or not a rights plan was
deployed in the best interests of the shareholders.  Since courts have
limited expertise in matters that relate to business judgment and
valuation, it can be affirmed with relative certainty that courts should
refrain from intervening when shareholders approval of the plan has been
obtained considering the matter relates to an economics issue rather than
a corporate governance one317.  Shareholders' approval should inevitably
influence the court in finding against an allegation of oppression.  A court
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318. Under s.241 of the C.B.C.A, a complainant may apply to a court for an order varying
or setting aside a transaction or contract to which a corporation is a party if, inter alia,
any act of the corporation or the powers of the directors of the corporation have been
exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly
disregards the interests of any security holder.  See Re Sabex Internationale Ltée,
(1979) 6 B.L.R. 65 (Qué. S.C.) where Gonthier J. held a right offering dilutive effects
to be oppressive to minority shareholders' rights.
319. It is to be noted that no U.S. company with a poison pill plan has ever allowed the
rights to be exercised.  Poison pill plans have always been used as a means to negotiate
with an acquiror.
may however hold that while the creation of a rights plan is not oppres-
sive, the operation of the plan, in particular circumstances may affect
shareholders' rights in an oppressive manner318.
A Canadian court should also intervene if it has any doubts about the
use of a rights plan and force the redemption of the rights in order  to
insure  that  the  final  question  of  whether  the  company should be sold
be left in the sole hands of the owners of said company319.
Considering the inherent risk that the integrity of the company's board
of directors decision-making process may be compromised by motives of
self-entrenchment in the adoption and/or the operation of the rights plan,
a heightened standard of review is thus suggested.
Shareholder wealth maximization, which should be the ultimate
justification for a shareholders' rights plan is likely to be incorporated in
the courts standard of review.
In Canada, there is relatively less take-over litigation than in the U.S.
While different in details, both countries regulatory systems, reflecting
the uniform character of the take-over bid as a legal institution, are
necessarily analogous.  It is thus to our advantage that we can benefit
from the massive quantity of thoroughly analyzed U.S. cases.
Will the Canadian courts defer to actions taken by securities
regulators having regard to their statutory mandate and their expertise in
the matter or will they address the issue head on and turn the poison pill
into a placebo?
It is to be hoped that a clear judicial framework will be developed in
Canada in the area of take-over defences and will delineate reasonable
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and clear boundaries of legitimate activity and determine the available
recourses when such limits are transgressed.
Hopefully the Québec Superior Court's decision in the Inco case will
provide the Canadian legal community with these much awaited
guidelines.
